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ABSTRACT 
  Despite the recognized impact that the national administrative state 
has had on the federal system, the relationship between federalism 
and administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed. 
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests that the Court is increasingly 
focused on this relationship and is using administrative law to address 
federalism concerns even as it refuses to curb Congress’s regulatory 
authority on constitutional grounds. This Article explores how 
administrative law may be becoming the new federalism and assesses 
how well-adapted administrative law is to performing this role. It 
argues that administrative law has important federalism-reinforcing 
features and represents a critical approach for securing the continued 
vibrancy of federalism in the world of administrative governance. It 
further defends this use of administrative law as constitutionally 
legitimate. The Article concludes with suggestions for how the Court 
should develop administrative law’s federalism potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few doubt the tremendous impact that the modern 
administrative state has had on the nation’s federal system. Congress 
and the president have long acknowledged the relationship between 
federalism and administrative government, incorporating the states as 
central players in major federal regulatory schemes.1 Scholars, too, 
have taken heed. In particular, federalism scholarship’s growing 
fixation with preemption has underscored the effect of federal 
administrative action on the states.2 Recent aggressive efforts by 
federal agencies to preempt state law, especially state tort law, have 
brought to the fore the crucial link between federalism and 
administrative government.3 Such administrative preemption 
 
 1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000) (granting states the primary responsibility for 
implementing the Clean Air Act); see also infra text accompanying notes 111–13 (discussing 
congressional and executive measures aimed at protecting states from federal agency 
intrusions). 
 2. As evidence of this fixation, the period 2007–2008 has witnessed publication of three 
prominent works on preemption: FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL 
INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007), PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE 
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF PREEMPTION’S CORE QUESTIONS (William W. Buzbee ed., 
forthcoming 2008), and THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (forthcoming 2008), 
in addition to numerous articles on the topic from a variety of perspectives (empirical, doctrinal, 
historical). 
 3. See, e.g., 6 C.F.R. § 27.405(a) (2008) (stating, in a provision of a Department of 
Homeland Security regulation on Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, that any state 
law, regulation, administrative action, or state court decision based on state law that “conflicts 
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threatens to impose significant burdens on the ability of states to 
exercise independent regulatory authority, a core concern of 
federalism.4 
Nonetheless, the relationship between federalism and federal 
administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed. 
Administrative law’s constitutional dimensions—in particular, 
doctrines of separation of powers and procedural due process—are 
generally recognized to have significant federalism implications.5 But 
more run-of-the-mill administrative law concerns—such as whether 
an agency adequately followed required procedures, engaged in 
reasoned decisionmaking, or deserves judicial deference with respect 
to its statutory interpretations—are rarely viewed through a 
federalism lens. This is all the more surprising given the current focus 
on preemption because despite their importance to federalism, 
preemption determinations are understood as turning on questions of 
 
with, hinders, poses an obstacle to or frustrates the purposes of this regulation” is preempted); 
12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006) (stating in effect, in an Office for the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) rule, that state supervision of state-chartered subsidiaries of national banks is 
preempted); Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 13,472, 13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633) (stating, in the preamble 
to a final Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) rule on mattress safety, that the 
standard would preempt “non-identical state requirements which seek to reduce the risk of . . . 
mattress fires”); Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Prods., 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,933–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 201, 314, and 601) (stating in the preamble to a final Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
rule on drug labeling that the FDA views its approval of a prescription drug label as preempting 
not just state regulations but also state tort law); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof 
Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223, 49,246 (Aug. 23, 2005) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) 
(containing a proposed National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rule for 
improving roof strength performance in rollover crashes and stating that, if adopted, the rule 
“would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements, including rules of tort law”). A 
number of articles have discussed these regulations. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical 
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1553–
54, 1573–75 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227, 229–42 (2007). In addition, these 
regulations led to a Senate hearing on preemption. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal 
Agencies Usurping Congressional and State Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2–3 (2007). 
 4. In this Article, I use “federalism,” “federalism concerns,” and “state interests” to refer 
primarily to protecting the ability of the states to exercise meaningful regulatory power in their 
own right. Others have similarly identified preserving state regulatory autonomy as central to 
the project of federalism. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–15, 23–36 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1995); Bradford R. Clark, Separation 
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1328–31, 1430–33 (2001). 
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statutory interpretation rather than constitutional law.6 To be sure, 
the focus on preemption has sparked much discussion of the extent to 
which administrative agencies should be able to determine the 
preemptive scope of federal law. Yet few legal scholars have gone 
beyond the administrative preemption debate to consider the broader 
relationship between federalism and federal administrative law. 
Moreover, within this debate the focus has been on the tensions 
between federalism and administrative law, with little attention paid 
to the potential synergies between the two.7 
Recent Supreme Court case law suggests that this curtain on the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law may be 
lifting. In a number of decisions, the Court has demonstrated an 
unwillingness to impose significant constitutional limits on the 
substantive scope of Congress’s regulatory powers. Yet it has also 
indicated that federalism concerns about protecting the states’ 
independent regulatory role retain traction. The vehicle by which the 
Court appears to be addressing such concerns, however, is 
administrative law. Acting ostensibly through the rubric of standard 
administrative law doctrines, such as reasoned decisionmaking 
requirements and the established framework for review of agency 
statutory interpretations, the Court has ensured that the impact of 
challenged agency decisions on the states is considered. As a result, 
administrative law may be becoming the home of a new federalism. 
These moves toward transforming administrative law into a 
federalism vehicle remain largely undeveloped. The Court has not yet 
articulated a coherent account of how federalism and administrative 
law should be integrated; indeed, it has not acknowledged that such 
an account may be needed or even explicitly viewed its recent efforts 
in this light. Suggestions that administrative law may be the new 
federalism are present in only a handful of decisions, too few to draw 
any reliable inferences of a new doctrinal trend. Moreover, all of 
these decisions were highly contentious and may turn out to be 
essentially fact dependent and result driven. At a minimum, however, 
the Court appears to be increasingly aware of administrative law’s 
importance to federalism.8 Exploring the relationship between 
 
 6. See Young, supra note 4, at 133. 
 7. See infra Part II.D. 
 8. On the Court’s docket for the October 2007 Term were two cases addressing the 
preemptive effect of federal administrative determinations. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. 
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federalism and administrative law seems particularly useful at this 
early juncture, when the Court’s jurisprudence on the question is still 
in a formative state. 
My aim in this Article is twofold: first, to examine how the Court 
may be employing administrative law as a vehicle for addressing 
federalism concerns; and second, to assess how well administrative 
law performs this role and how the Court should understand the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law. I conclude 
that administrative law has important federalism-reinforcing features, 
but that the Court’s decisions to date have failed to fully develop 
administrative law’s federalism potential. I also argue that the best 
approach—not only for the functioning of federal agencies but, 
critically, for the continued vibrancy of federalism in the world of the 
modern national administrative state—is for the Court (and Congress 
and the president) to advance federalism concerns within the overall 
rubric of administrative law. 
The Article consists of four parts. Part I contains an analysis of 
recent Supreme Court precedent, focusing in particular on six 
decisions addressing the intersection of federalism and administrative 
law. Part II advances the claim that administrative law may be 
becoming the locus of a new federalism. Here I contend that the 
Court is unwilling to curb Congress on federalism grounds and is 
instead addressing federalism concerns through an administrative law 
framework. I then examine two ways in which this phenomenon is 
occurring: application of ordinary administrative law to the benefit of 
the states, and development of more extraordinary federalism-
inspired administrative law analyses. I also discuss the current 
administrative preemption debate, which I contend approaches the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law in overly 
narrow terms. 
 
Ct. 1168 (2008) (mem.), aff’g by an equally divided Court Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 
467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a state product liability action against a federally-
approved drug was not preempted); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008) 
(holding state tort law action preempted by the FDA’s premarket scrutiny and approval of the 
challenged medical device). In addition, in the October 2008 Term, the Court will hear another 
preemption case, Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), 
which raises the question of whether the FDA’s approval of a drug label preempts a state tort 
suit alleging that a drug manufacturer failed to provide adequate warning of a drug’s dangers. 
See infra text accompanying notes 86–92. 
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Part III turns to a more normative and theoretical perspective. I 
begin by examining whether administrative law is likely to prove an 
effective mechanism for addressing federalism concerns. In addition 
to rejecting claims that administrative agencies are categorically ill-
suited to protecting state regulatory autonomy, I emphasize the need 
to distinguish between administrative agencies and administrative 
law. I argue that three features of administrative law hold strong 
potential to protect state interests: administrative law’s procedural 
and substantive requirements, in particular its provisions for notice-
and-comment rulemaking and the demand for reasoned 
decisionmaking; its doctrinal and institutional capaciousness; and its 
very status as nonconstitutional and generally applicable law. I then 
turn to analyzing whether using administrative law as a vehicle for 
advancing federalism is a legitimate judicial undertaking or instead an 
instance of courts unjustifiably intruding on congressional power. I 
conclude that this use is legitimate and underscore the benefits of 
such an administrative law approach over alternative federalism 
doctrines. 
Finally, in Part IV, I assess the implications of this analysis of 
administrative law’s federalism potential. One implication is that the 
Court should employ administrative law with an eye to reinforcing 
agencies’ sensitivity and responsiveness to state interests. A second is 
that federalism concerns raised by federal agency action may be best 
advanced through ordinary administrative law, albeit with express 
recognition of how state interests factor into judicial review. 
Although the Court’s recent decisions take some helpful steps in this 
direction, their lack of clarity and reflection on how federalism 
concerns should factor into application of administrative law limit 
their generative potential. 
I.  A FEDERALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SEXTET 
Federalism and federal administrative law are an unfamiliar 
couple, particularly in Supreme Court precedent. Although the Court 
regularly decides cases involving one or the other of these topics, and 
both are sometimes present in cases before it, for the most part the 
two remain doctrinally and analytically separate. But in six recent, 
highly charged decisions, issued over a four-year period, the 
relationship of federalism and administrative law has repeatedly risen 
to the fore. Most prominently this has taken the form of an injection 
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of federalism into administrative law challenges of federal agency 
action. Yet the reverse has also occurred, with administrative law 
surfacing in more straightforward federalism challenges. Studying this 
sextet of decisions offers insights into the Court’s growing awareness 
of the intersection between federalism and administrative law. 
A. Federalism’s Appearance in Administrative Law Challenges 
Challenges to actions by federal agencies are a regular staple of 
the Court’s docket. Of late, the Court’s administrative law 
jurisprudence has focused overwhelmingly on determining when 
agency statutory interpretations should receive Chevron deference.9 
The three federal agency challenges discussed in this Section—Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA,10 
Gonzales v. Oregon,11 and Massachusetts v. EPA12—share that focus; 
each involves a challenge to agency interpretation of a governing 
statute.13 What differentiates them—aside from being high profile, 
 
 9. E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2344 (2007); Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005); Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 215 (2002). “Chevron deference” refers to deference under the well-
known framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretations laid out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). For a description of the Chevron 
framework, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191–92 (2006). 
 10. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 11. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 12. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 13. A fourth decision that might be included in this category is Rapanos v. United States, 
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (plurality opinion). There, in rejecting the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
view of its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA) as too broad, id. at 2220, the plurality 
opinion by Justice Scalia emphasized that “the Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of 
Congress’s commerce power” and intruded on “‘the States’ traditional and primary power over 
land and water use’ [by] . . . authoriz[ing] the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of 
immense stretches of intrastate land,” id. at 2224 (citations omitted) (quoting Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001)). The plurality relied on these federalism concerns to justify its refusal to defer to the 
Corps’ statutory interpretation under Chevron, emphasizing that it “would expect a clearer 
statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope 
of constitutional validity.” Id. Justice Scalia also emphasized that Congress’s policy in the CWA 
intended to have the states play the primary role in pollution reduction and regulating use of 
land and water resources. Id. Yet the extent to which the plurality opinion in Rapanos actually 
rests on federalism concerns is unclear. The opinion also contended that the Corps’ 
interpretation was contrary to the text of the CWA, id. at 2220, and Justice Scalia’s invocation 
of federalism at the end of the opinion has an air of gilding the lily. In addition, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued in his concurrence that had the EPA and the Corps gone forward with a 
proposed rulemaking on the jurisdictional question, their views of the CWA’s “broad [and] 
somewhat ambiguous” terms would have been entitled to deference—suggesting that federalism 
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very contentious decisions—is the way that members of the Court 
invoked federalism concerns in determining whether to uphold the 
challenged agency action. 
1. ADEC v. EPA.  The first decision in this series, ADEC, was 
issued in 2004 and involved the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA).14 Under that 
Act, no source emitting more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides a year 
can be constructed or modified without obtaining a permit,15 and no 
permit can be issued “unless the facility uses the ‘best available 
control technology’ (BACT)” for each CAA pollutant it emits.16 
States can obtain permitting authority from the EPA. If states do so, 
they have primary responsibility for implementing the CAA within 
their territory, including the responsibility for issuing permits and 
making BACT determinations.17 
The question in ADEC was whether the EPA had authority to 
supervise a state’s BACT determinations.18 The EPA read the CAA 
as granting it authority to block construction of a facility permitted by 
a state when it determined that the state’s BACT determination was 
unreasonable.19 In a 5–4 decision, the Court agreed, arguing that the 
EPA’s interpretation, although “not qualify[ing] for the dispositive 
force described in Chevron”20 because promulgated in internal 
guidance memoranda that lacked the force of law, “nevertheless 
warrant[s] respect.”21 The Court further upheld the EPA’s conclusion 
 
was not determinative of his view of the case either. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In 
any event, Justice Kennedy dismissed the plurality’s invocation of the avoidance canon on 
federalism grounds, see id. at 2246, 2249–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and his vote concurring 
in the judgment was determinative of the result in the case. 
 14. ADEC, 540 U.S. at 468. 
 15. Id. at 472 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1) (2000) (requiring a “major emitting facility” to 
obtain a permit); 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (defining “major emitting facility” as one “with the potential 
to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant”)). 
 16. Id. at 468 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (describing the states’ responsibility in implementing the CAA); id.  
§ 7661a (establishing the procedure for delegating “permitting authority” to states); id.  
§ 7479(3) (giving the “permitting authority” the ability to make “best available control 
technology” (BACT) determinations). 
 18. ADEC, 540 U.S. at 469. 
 19. Id. at 485. 
 20. Id. at 487. 
 21. Id. at 488 (quoting Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)). 
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that the state environmental agency had acted unreasonably in 
finding the facility met the CAA’s BACT requirements and issuing a 
permit.22 
From the majority’s perspective, ADEC was simply an ordinary 
administrative challenge, one in which federalism figured hardly at all 
and instead the expertise and enforcement needs of the federal 
agency charged with implementation dominated. By contrast, Justice 
Kennedy in dissent viewed the case fundamentally in federalism 
terms. He argued vociferously that the Court’s decision remitted 
“[t]he federal balance . . . to a single agency official”23 and 
“relegat[ed] States to the role of mere provinces or political 
corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same 
dignity and respect.”24 The majority responded that the federal courts 
were available to protect the states against EPA overreaching, 
suggesting that it was not rejecting potential federalism concerns 
wholesale but instead simply did not find such concerns implicated in 
the specific agency action before it.25 For the most part, however, the 
majority and dissent in ADEC talked past one another rather than 
attempting to resolve the tension between their federalism and 
administrative law rubrics. 
As a result, ADEC offers little guidance about how the Court 
believes federalism and administrative law principles should be 
integrated. Yet it is an early signal of the Court’s awareness of the 
potential connections between these two areas of doctrine. 
2. Gonzales v. Oregon.  In Oregon, the relationship between 
federalism and administrative law, hinted at in ADEC, assumed 
 
 22. Id. at 496. 
 23. Id. at 517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 518. 
 25. Id. at 495 (majority opinion). The facts of the case offer support for the majority’s view. 
The CAA assigned the EPA an oversight role regarding state permitting decisions and 
implementation decisions, see id. at 468–69, and no one disputed that the EPA had authority to 
prohibit a facility’s construction or modification in some circumstances, see id. at 484–85. The 
EPA had long asserted the power over BACT determinations it claimed here, had raised its 
concerns with the state agency beforehand, and had suggested ways the state agency could 
justify its determination. See id. at 478–81. In addition, the state agency’s final BACT 
determination does seem to be motivated by reluctance to impose costs on a major employer in 
northwest Alaska rather than environmental concerns; notably, the state agency never 
explained the inconsistency between its ultimate BACT determination and its initial assessment 
that greater emissions control was economically feasible. Id. at 498–500. 
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center stage. Decided in 2006, Oregon involved a challenge to 
Attorney General John Ashcroft’s implementation of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).26 Under the CSA, physicians can lawfully 
dispense controlled substances only if they are registered to do so 
with the attorney general.27 In 2001, Ashcroft issued an interpretive 
rule stating that prescribing controlled substances to assist suicide was 
grounds for suspending or revoking a doctor’s CSA registration 
because assisting suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose.28 As a 
practical matter, this rule would have nullified Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act, which legalized prescribing drugs to allow terminally ill 
patients to commit suicide;29 doctors would be unwilling to issue such 
prescriptions if by doing so they risked losing their right to prescribe 
controlled substances altogether. Indeed, preventing assisted suicide 
under the Oregon act was the primary motivation behind the rule’s 
promulgation.30 
In Oregon, the Court held that Ashcroft’s interpretive rule 
violated the CSA and was thus invalid.31 The majority decision, 
written by Justice Kennedy, portrayed its resolution of Oregon’s 
challenge as an ordinary assessment of whether an executive official 
had exceeded statutory authority—“an inquiry familiar to the courts” 
that was guided by “familiar principles” of administrative law.32 In 
particular, the majority relied on the Court’s 2001 decision in United 
States v. Mead Corp.,33 which had limited Chevron deference to 
instances when Congress had delegated authority to issue rules with 
the force of law to the agency.34 The Oregon majority held that 
 
 26. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006). 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(2) (2000). 
 28. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 911. 
 29. Id. at 911, 914 (describing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2003)). 
 30. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 913. 
 31. Id. at 925. 
 32. Id. at 911, 914. 
 33. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 34. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 915 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27). The Oregon majority also 
cited precedent that precludes application of Chevron deference in contexts in which more than 
one agency is given sole interpretive authority under a statute, see id. at 922, and noted that the 
CSA grants the secretary of Health and Human Services a central role when medical judgments 
are involved, id. at 921; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 215–16, 242–44 (emphasizing the importance of 
Congress’s decision to delegate to multiple agents in the CSA). Interestingly, the Court did not 
rely on the suggestion in Mead that Chevron deference generally should apply only to agency 
statutory interpretations promulgated through agency procedures such as notice-and-comment 
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Congress had not delegated authority to determine what constitutes 
legitimate medical practice to the attorney general, and thus that the 
interpretive rule did not merit Chevron deference.35 More generally, 
the majority’s opinion was animated by concerns of executive branch 
overreaching and self-aggrandizement. The danger it invoked was of 
a single executive official, lacking professional expertise and 
motivated by politics, imposing on the nation that official’s personal 
views of what constituted legitimate medical practice.36 Oregon thus 
stands as a prime example of administrative law’s longstanding 
concerns with politics trumping law and unchecked executive 
authority.37 
Yet the decision also plainly turns on federalism concerns. It was 
not simply concentrated power in the attorney general that troubled 
the majority, but more specifically that “a single Executive officer 
[would have] the power to effect a radical shift of authority from the 
States to the Federal Government to define general standards of 
medical practice in every locality.”38 Such a result was at odds with 
usual practice, under which “regulation of health and safety is 
‘primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.’”39 Reading the 
CSA against this federalism backdrop, the majority rejected the idea 
that through the statute Congress had intended to assert “expansive 
 
rulemaking, Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, perhaps because that aspect of Mead has proven more 
contentious for some members of the Court, see, e.g., Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 
(2002). 
 35. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 916; see also id. at 922 (holding that the attorney general’s 
interpretation also was not due Skidmore deference). 
 36. Id. at 924 (“The primary problem with the Government’s argument . . . is its 
assumption that the CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because 
it may be inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice.”); see also id. at 
913–14, 922 (emphasizing the attorney general’s lack of any medical expertise and failure to 
consult before issuing the interpretive rule—either with Oregon or others in the executive 
branch—as well as noting Ashcroft’s prior efforts to prevent Oregon’s experiment with assisted 
suicide when he was a member of the Senate). 
 37. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 95. Professor Lisa Bressman has offered a slightly different 
take on Oregon, arguing that it was the profoundly undemocratic aspect of the interpretive rule 
that made the Court reluctant to defer. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 765, 776–80 (2007). 
 38. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 925. The similarity between this language and that of the ADEC 
dissent is more than just coincidence, as Justice Kennedy was the author of both. 
 39. Id. at 923 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
719 (1985)). 
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federal authority to regulate medicine.”40 Instead, it portrayed the 
CSA as having a far more limited aim, preventing drug abuse and 
drug trafficking, and as relying on state regulation of medical 
practice.41 
Oregon therefore represents an instance in which the Court 
directly linked federalism to federal administrative law.42 On the 
surface the majority’s integration of these two appears smooth; 
according to the majority, the federalism implications of the 
interpretive rule provided reason to doubt the attorney general’s 
claim of delegated authority and to refuse to defer to his view of the 
CSA.43 But tensions exist underneath this superficial doctrinal 
consistency. A difficult question left open by the majority opinion is 
whether the result would have been different had the attorney 
general’s rejection of assisted suicide emerged from a more 
consultative, formal process in which views of the secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were solicited and 
given determinative weight. Put differently, was the real problem 
here a violation of federalism norms or deviation from appropriate 
administrative process?44 Answering this question was not necessary 
to resolve the case, but leaving it open obscures the import of Oregon 
regarding how federalism and administrative law intersect. In 
addition, the contrast between Oregon and ADEC is noteworthy; in 
Oregon, the Court invoked federalism as a reason not to defer to a 
 
 40. Id. at 924. 
 41. Id. at 922–23. For a similar invocation of federalism to justify a narrower reading of a 
federal statute than that offered by the federal agency charged with its implementation, see 
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223–24 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 42. This linkage was already present in the case, as the Ninth Circuit had heavily stressed 
federalism in invalidating the interpretive rule. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th 
Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 43. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 923–24. 
 44. The decision’s narrow view of the CSA appears to preclude the latter possibility, as 
does its emphasis on Congress’s role in maintaining the federal-state balance and the statute’s 
express restriction on preemption. Id. at 922–25. But that conclusion is somewhat at odds with 
the opinion’s repeated emphasis on “the Secretary’s primacy in shaping medical policy under 
the CSA,” and its assertion that “no question” exists that the federal government has 
constitutional authority to regulate medical practice. Id. at 925; see also Gersen, supra note 34, 
at 242–45 (noting emphasis on role of both HHS and the states in the opinion). Moreover, given 
the majority’s recognition that “legitimate medical purpose” is ambiguous, it is unclear why such 
a joint, administratively proper determination by the federal officials delegated authority in this 
area by Congress should not be given deference. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 916 (quoting 21 U.S.C.  
§ 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000)). 
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federal agency’s assertion of authority, whereas in ADEC the Court 
did defer notwithstanding the troubling federalism implications of 
doing so. Although largely fueled by factual differences between the 
two cases,45 this unexplained discrepancy in results reinforces the 
sense that the Court lacks a consistent understanding of the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law. 
3. Massachusetts v. EPA.  Federalism and administrative law 
were again expressly linked one year later in Massachusetts. There, in 
a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to 
regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air 
pollutants,46 and that the reasons the EPA gave to justify this refusal 
violated the CAA.47 As presented to the Court, Massachusetts 
appeared to be a straightforward administrative law challenge—
indeed, federalism was almost entirely absent from the case as it was 
briefed to the Court and in the decision below.48 The majority opinion 
in Massachusetts imbued the case with federalism implications, 
however, by emphasizing Massachusetts’s status as a sovereign state 
in holding that Massachusetts had standing to sue. According to the 
majority, “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking 
review here is a sovereign State”:49 
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign 
prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an 
emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the 
 
 45. The EPA’s actions in ADEC lacked many of the indicia of abuse and federal agency 
overreaching that characterized the attorney general’s interpretive rule in Oregon. See supra 
note 25. 
 46. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007). 
 47. Id. at 1463. 
 48. Federalism concerns surfaced in only one amicus brief submitted by Arizona and other 
states on behalf of Massachusetts. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 22–24, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380; 
Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1, 5 & n.18, 30–31 (2007) (noting that the issue of “special standing” for states was absent 
from the briefs except for the amicus brief filed by Arizona). Nor was the case an obvious 
vehicle for raising federalism concerns, given that it arose from a rulemaking petition filed with 
the EPA by private environmental groups; Massachusetts and other governments intervened in 
the case only after the rulemaking petition was denied. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct at 1449–51. 
 49. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
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exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle 
emissions might well be pre-empted. 
  These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal 
Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect 
Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing [air pollutant] 
standards . . . . Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition 
as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right and 
Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.50 
Despite taking the initiative to invoke federalism concerns, the 
majority was quite imprecise with respect to how Massachusetts’s 
sovereignty interests were implicated.51 Massachusetts was not 
claiming that its own regulatory efforts were unduly preempted by the 
EPA or that the federal government was exceeding its constitutional 
powers—on the contrary, Massachusetts’s central allegation was that 
the federal government was not asserting its authority enough.52 The 
majority never explained why, having ceded regulatory authority to 
the federal government over an area of activity, a state would 
continue to have a sovereignty interest in forcing the federal 
government to exercise that authority in a particular manner. 
 
 50. Id. at 1454–55 (citations omitted). 
 51. The majority sought to draw an analogy to parens patriae precedent involving interstate 
pollution, in which the Court had emphasized the “quasi-sovereign” state interest “in all the 
earth and air within its domain” and in having “the last word as to whether its mountains shall 
be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” Id. at 1454 (quoting 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). Insofar as the majority was using these 
cases to establish that Massachusetts had a cognizable interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign 
territory” which was being lost due to rising water levels, the invocation of Massachusetts’s state 
status seems unnecessary, given that Massachusetts actually owned a “great deal” of coastal 
property in the state. Id. at 1454. If, on the other hand, the majority sought to draw a connection 
to Massachusetts’s regulatory interest in controlling pollutant emissions within its borders, 
then—as Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent—the federal-state context of the dispute 
before the Court rendered this interstate precedent inapplicable. See id. at 1465–66 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). States did not cede regulatory authority over their territory to each other by 
joining the union, but they did grant such power to the federal government. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, existing precedent is far less sympathetic to a state’s assertion of quasi-sovereign 
interests on behalf of its citizens against the federal government. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & 
Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). 
 52. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1449, 1451 (majority opinion). 
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One possible explanation focuses on preemption. Section 209(a) 
of the CAA prohibits any state or political subdivision from adopting 
or enforcing “any standard relating to the control of emissions from 
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”53 This prohibition 
arguably gives states distinct sovereign interests in ensuring that the 
EPA fulfills its statutory duties. On this view, given that Congress has 
disabled them from asserting regulatory authority in their own right, 
the states have a sovereign interest in ensuring that the federal 
government performs its regulatory responsibilities so that regulatory 
gaps are avoided.54 Such an argument for state standing is open to a 
variety of objections—among others, that allowing states access to 
federal court based solely on sovereignty interests fails to accord with 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). Section 209(b) provides that the EPA must grant a waiver 
for emissions controls promulgated by any state that had standards for emissions from new 
automobiles prior to March 30, 1966—which means California, as it was the only state to have 
such standards—provided the state determines that its “standards will be, in the aggregate, at 
least as protective of public health and welfare” as the federal standards and the EPA does not 
find that this state determination is arbitrary and capricious, that the state does not need the 
standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or that the state’s standards are 
inconsistent with Section 202(a). Id. § 7543(b)(1); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Kathryn A. Watts & Amy 
J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global 
Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1029, 1037 (2008) (discussing the special role 
California plays in setting new automobile emission standards). In addition, the 1977 Clean Air 
Act Amendments provided that other states could adopt standards identical to California 
standards that have received a waiver. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
95, sec. 129(b), § 177, 91 Stat. 685, 750 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(B)); 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 525. California issued such emission standards for 
greenhouse gases, which were then adopted by eleven other states. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1499, 1526–27 (2000). California sought a waiver for these standards, which the EPA 
denied in December 2007, two years after the request was filed. See Letter from Stephen 
Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. For analysis of California’s waiver 
request, see Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 
19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 15–29), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096571; Nina A. Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver 
Decision and Agency Interpretation: A Response to Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 2157, 2161 (2008). 
 54. See Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary 
Citizens?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1774 (2008); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 53, at 
1034. In addition, the CAA embodies a cooperative regulatory framework under which states 
bear responsibility in the first instance for devising plans to ensure that air pollutant emissions 
within their borders meet federal air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The special role the 
states play in implementing the CAA could also be thought to give them added ability to 
challenge determinations the EPA makes under the Act. 
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the Constitution’s limitation of the federal judicial power to “cases” 
and “controversies” and thus to legal as opposed to political disputes. 
But it at least offers an explanation of why state sovereignty interests 
might be seen as implicated by the administrative challenge before 
the Court. 
This alternative account is not, however, one offered by the 
Massachusetts majority.55 Instead, although it indicates that the Court 
perceived a connection between federalism and this challenge to 
federal agency action, the opinion—like the opinions in ADEC and 
Oregon—leaves the nature of this connection quite opaque. Perhaps 
the majority’s emphasis on state status is a signal of the Court 
developing a deeper understanding of the role that states can play in 
overseeing federal program administration. Or perhaps this emphasis 
was simply a way of garnering Justice Kennedy’s vote and is a rule 
good for one case only, with the ultimate significance of 
Massachusetts being simply its forgiving application of the standard 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife56 standing analysis to force the 
government to address global warming.57 A third, equally plausible 
view is that Massachusetts will serve to undermine private groups’ 
access to the courts to challenge regulatory inaction, with the looser 
application of Lujan’s demands of injury, causation, and 
redressability being limited to instances in which states are plaintiffs. 
B. Administrative Law’s Appearance in Federalism Challenges 
Just as federalism has surfaced in administrative law challenges, 
so too has administrative law appeared in the Court’s federalism 
decisions, albeit to date playing a more tangential role. Here three 
 
 55. Although the majority insisted that Massachusetts was simply asserting “its rights under 
[the CAA],” Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17, the rights it was referring to were simply 
Massachusetts’s rights to petition the EPA to engage in a rulemaking regarding new motor 
vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases and to challenge the EPA’s violation of statutory 
requirements. The problem is that these rights were in no way unique to Massachusetts as a 
state. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (providing that a petition seeking review of the administrator’s 
action in promulgating a standard under § 7521 or any final action taken by the administrator 
must be filed in the D.C. Circuit, but not limiting who can file such a petition); see also id. § 7604 
(authorizing “any person” to bring a suit against the administrator to challenge the 
administrator’s failure to undertake a nondiscretionary duty). 
 56. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 57. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 67. 
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decisions are particularly noteworthy: Gonzales v. Raich,58 Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank,59 and Riegel v. Medtronic.60 
1. Gonzales v. Raich.  Decided a year before Oregon, Raich 
also involved the CSA, but it focused on whether the CSA fell within 
Congress’s commerce power. In 1996 California passed a medical 
marijuana initiative, legalizing personal medical use and possession of 
marijuana.61 The California law conflicted with the CSA, which lists 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug and therefore prohibits all use of it.62 
Two women who used marijuana under the terms of the California 
measure brought suit, arguing that the CSA’s ban exceeded 
Congress’s commerce power as applied to the cultivation, possession, 
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes.63 By a 6–3 vote, 
the Court rejected this claim.64 The Raich majority was unsympathetic 
to the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, emphasizing that Congress has 
“power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”65 Describing the activities regulated by the CSA as 
“quintessentially economic,”66 the majority held that “Congress had a 
 
 58. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 59. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). 
 60. Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). In addition, in a few cases involving 
challenges to state actions in the context of cooperative federal-state programs, the Court 
emphasized the importance of the views of the federal agency involved. See, e.g., S.D. Warren 
Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2006); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. 
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 666–68 (2003); Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship 
Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003). Interestingly, however—and consistent with 
developments in administrative law generally—the Court generally gave little weight to federal 
views when those views were simply presented in amicus briefs in court, as opposed to officially 
adopted by the agency in the course of its implementation of the relevant statute. See, e.g., Ark. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Alhborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 1764–65 (2006); Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality 
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (making no reference to the United States’ views in favor 
of preemption presented only in amicus briefs, notwithstanding that the Court agreed that 
California’s fleet rules were preempted). 
 61. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 
2007). 
 62. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199, 2204. 
 63. Id. at 2199–200. 
 64. Id. at 2209. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the five-Justice 
majority that application of the CSA here was constitutional. Id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
 65. Id. at 2205 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. at 2211. 
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rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole 
in the CSA” and undermine that statute’s comprehensive regulatory 
scheme.67 By contrast, the dissent insisted that the relevant activity 
was the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal 
medical purposes, which it deemed noneconomic and outside the 
scope of the commerce power.68 
Raich is overwhelmingly a federalism decision, centered squarely 
on the scope of Congress’s constitutional powers. But administrative 
law also surfaces here, with the Court repeatedly noting that under 
the CSA the attorney general has authority to change a drug’s 
schedule classification.69 Moreover, despite protesting that the 
specifics of how marijuana is regulated had “no relevance” to the 
question of congressional power, the majority went so far as to 
suggest that administrative denial of a petition to reschedule 
marijuana might well be overturned on appeal: “We acknowledge 
that evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding the 
effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, 
would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require 
marijuana to be listed in Schedule I.”70 
Although administrative law played only a marginal role in the 
majority opinion and was largely relegated to the footnotes, the 
interesting question is why it appeared at all. The most plausible 
explanation is that it offered some solace against the specter of 
unlimited federal power. The majority wanted to underscore that 
finding an activity to fall within the scope of Congress’s constitutional 
authority did not mean that the resulting federal regulation was free 
of all legal constraints against federal overreaching.71 The 
rescheduling option may have been “irrelevant” to the constitutional 
question of the scope of congressional authority, but it was quite 
relevant on an operational federalism level as a means states could 
exploit to preserve the ability to experiment with medical care and 
 
 67. Id. at 2209. 
 68. Id. at 2224–29 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 2204 & n.23, 2211 n.25 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 2211 n.37. 
 71. Nor did such a finding mean that the regulation was free from political constraints. See 
id. at 2215 (“[P]erhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, 
in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the halls of 
Congress.”). 
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obtain judicial scrutiny of federal determinations. Like ADEC, 
however, the Raich majority failed to spell out the relationship it saw 
between federalism and administrative law, thereby limiting the 
decision’s impact on future cases. 
2. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.  The Watters decision was 
handed down just two weeks after Massachusetts. Watters involved 
the interplay between federal and state banking authorities, and in 
particular the extent of supervision the latter could assert over state-
chartered subsidiaries of national banks. Under the National Bank 
Act (NBA), national or federally chartered banks are subject to 
oversight by the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), with states generally being denied any supervisory or 
oversight authority.72 Ordinarily, state-chartered banking institutions 
are subject to state oversight, which in the case of Michigan’s law 
meant that institutions had to obtain a state license, file reports with 
the state, and submit to state audits.73 In 2001, the OCC promulgated 
a regulation providing that “State laws apply to national bank 
operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the 
parent national bank.”74 Given that state supervisory laws do not 
apply to national banks under the NBA absent an express statutory 
provision to the contrary, the import of the regulation was to preempt 
state supervision in regard to all national bank operating 
subsidiaries.75 
Watters appeared to be the occasion on which the Court would 
resolve a recurrent question in preemption challenges that directly 
engages the relationship between federalism and administrative law: 
to what extent should courts defer to administrative agencies’ 
 
 72. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 93a, 371(a) (2000) (granting the OCC authority to issue rules and 
regulations regarding the powers of national banking associations); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. 
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995) (“As the administrator charged 
with supervision of the National Bank Act . . . the Comptroller bears primary responsibility for 
surveillance of ‘the business of banking’ authorized by § 24 . . . .” (citation omitted)). The NBA 
refers to such supervisory authority as “visitorial powers” and provides that “[n]o national bank 
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.” 12 U.S.C.  
§ 484(a); see also Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 114–17 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the meaning of “visitorial powers”). 
 73. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1565–66 (2007). 
 74. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2008). 
 75. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 5.34(e), 24a(g)(3)(A). The OCC also argued in favor of 
broad preemption of substantive state law as applied to national banks. See infra note 84. 
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interpretations of the preemptive scope of the statutes they 
administer?76 On the one hand, federalism concerns with intruding on 
a traditional area of state regulation, augmented by the presumption 
against preemption, counseled against granting deference to the 
OCC’s regulation.77 On the other, from a purely administrative law 
perspective, the OCC’s views deserved deference: the NBA did not 
expressly address the question of state supervision of national bank 
subsidiaries, the OCC was the federal agency charged with 
implementing the NBA, and the OCC had promulgated its regulation 
using notice-and-comment rulemaking. Ordinarily, these features 
would suffice to trigger Chevron deference.78 
The Supreme Court, however, held in a 5–3 decision that the 
NBA itself preempted state supervision over national bank 
subsidiaries, concluding therefore that the degree of deference due 
the OCC’s regulation was “an academic question” it need not 
address.79 But that the majority foreswore the need to discuss 
Chevron deference does not mean that the decision bypassed 
administrative law. On the contrary, its analysis fell well within the 
administrative law ambit: like Massachusetts, in administrative law 
terms the Watters decision represents a Chevron step one 
determination to the effect that the NBA unambiguously preempted 
the state supervisory and licensing requirements at issue.80 
Watters represents an expansive approach to preemption. The 
majority treated the possibility of both state and federal oversight of 
 
 76. For earlier decisions presenting but not resolving this question, see cases cited infra 
note 177. 
 77. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (describing the presumption 
against preemption set out in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 78. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350–51 (2007); 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). All of the appellate courts that 
considered challenges to state efforts to exercise oversight over national bank subsidiaries had 
invoked Chevron in upholding the OCC’s regulation. See Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 
463 F.3d 325, 331–33 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560–63 (6th 
Cir. 2005), aff’d 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 958–67 
(9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 79. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 & n.13 (2007). Justice 
Thomas did not participate. Id. at 1573. Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s view of the 
NBA and also argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate. See id. at 1578–79, 1581–85 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”). 
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state-chartered subsidiaries as an unjustified regulatory burden rather 
than as a common feature of a federal system—and one national 
banks could have avoided by not utilizing state-chartered 
subsidiaries.81 Indeed, the majority denied that a subsidiary’s state-
chartered status gave states any more legitimate interest in overseeing 
the subsidiary’s actions than the states would have in overseeing the 
subsidiary’s parent national bank. To a large extent, the majority’s 
unsympathetic stance to the states stemmed from the fact that the 
case involved the NBA, a statute the Court has consistently read as 
creating a presumption against state regulation of national banks and 
in favor of exclusive federal control.82 Yet application of the NBA 
presumption here was certainly contestable, given the importance of 
state- versus federal-chartered status to the nation’s dual banking 
system, as well as the lack of clear authorization in the NBA for 
either national banks’ use of state-chartered operating subsidiaries or 
the displacement of state supervision of such subsidiaries.83 
Perhaps more importantly, the majority never addressed the 
states’ concern that, absent some independent oversight role, they 
would lack the ability to enforce state laws to which the subsidiaries 
at issue were subject. Although such state laws were enforceable by 
the OCC, Michigan and its amici expressed concern that the OCC 
 
 81. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1568, 1572–73. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 1567 (“We have ‘interpreted grants of . . . powers to national banks as 
grants of authority . . . ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.’” (quoting Barnett Bank of 
Marion City, N.A., v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))); id. at 
1571 (“Security against significant interference by state regulators is a characteristic condition of 
the business of banking conducted by national banks . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Their different understandings of the NBA and banking in general may explain the interesting 
lineup of Justices in the case: Justice Ginsburg, often solicitous of state regulatory authority, 
wrote the majority opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Kennedy, id. at 1564, a frequent 
advocate of state interests. On the other hand, Justice Scalia, usually insistent on full-scale 
application of Chevron—including in Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 926 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for application of Chevron to agency action that preempted a state 
regulation)—joined Justice Stevens’ dissent that seemed to suggest Chevron was never 
applicable to preemptive agency action absent express statutory authorization, Watters, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1573 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption 
of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 35), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028886 (arguing that Watters reversed the presumptions 
that previously governed preemption determinations in the banking context); infra text 
accompanying notes 154–58 (discussing ambiguity in the NBA); see also Kenneth E. Scott, The 
Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1977) 
(describing the dual banking system and noting the importance played by the chartering entity). 
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was aggressively seeking to free national banks from state control and 
would prove unwilling to enforce state consumer protection laws in 
the place of state agencies.84 Yet the Watters majority opinion 
nowhere discusses the relationship between federal and state 
regulatory agencies, directing its attention instead solely to the 
relationship between federal and state legislation. 
Thus, despite being decided in close succession, Watters and 
Massachusetts are polar opposites in their approach to state interests. 
In Massachusetts, the Court injected federalism into what had 
previously been thought a purely administrative law case and 
underscored the legitimacy of undefined state sovereignty interests. 
By contrast, in Watters it declared federalism essentially irrelevant 
and gave little weight to a concern seemingly central to state 
sovereignty: ensuring adequate enforcement of state laws.85 The 
striking contrast between Massachusetts and Watters suggests 
confusion on the Court with respect to how to structure the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law.86 
 
 84. See Brief of Petitioner at 31–39, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 
2570336; Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 
Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570992; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, The 
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 275–76, 
292, 296–97 (2004) (arguing that the OCC is too self-interested on the question of preemption 
because of its reliance on fees from banks with national charters and describing the OCC’s 
advocacy of freedom from state laws as an advantage of a national charter). Conflicts between 
the OCC and the states were not limited to the state-chartered subsidiary context, but instead 
had also arisen in regard to enforcement of state consumer protection laws generally. See 
Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing OCC 
preemption of state enforcement of antidiscrimination laws relating to real estate lending 
practices); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory 
Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2284–86 (2004) (discussing OCC preemption of state 
predatory lending laws). Adding substance to the states’ fears are the OCC’s own statements 
indicating that it believes most substantive state laws are preempted as applied to national 
banks. See OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,895, 1,912–13 (Jan. 13, 2004); 
Wilmarth, supra, at 233. 
 85. The contrast is even starker if Massachusetts’s special rules for state standing are 
viewed as tied to preemption of state authority. On that view, Massachusetts’s logic would 
suggest that states should have standing to sue the OCC to enforce state laws if the OCC refuses 
to do so and the states are preempted from doing so themselves. But the Court never linked the 
two decisions or suggested that Massachusetts’s standing analysis offered a remedy for any 
enforcement gap Watters might create. 
 86. The Court may be forced to confront the administrative preemption issue head on in 
Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), a case on its 
calendar for the October 2008 Term addressing the extent to which approval of a prescription 
drug label by the FDA preempts state tort law actions based on that labeling. The FDA has 
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3. Riegel v. Medtronic.  The most recent member of the sextet, 
Riegel, was decided in the spring of 2008. Riegel arose out of a state 
tort suit involving a medical device that had received premarket 
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the 
premarket approval process created by the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (MDA).87 Characterizing this process as 
“rigorous”88 and emphasizing the extent of the FDA’s scrutiny, the 
Court held that the MDA expressly preempted application of 
common-law tort duties to a device that had received such approval 
and was in compliance with FDA requirements.89 
Although much less contentious,90 Riegel is in many ways a 
Watters redux, with the Court again eschewing the need to determine 
what level of deference to accord an administrative preemption 
determination by finding preemption clearly mandated by text of the 
relevant statute.91 Interestingly, the Court also referenced in passing 
standard administrative deference doctrines,92 suggesting that the 
Court did not view the preemption and federalism-laden posture of 
 
taken the position, in a preamble to a recent rule on drug labeling, that its labeling 
determinations are preemptive. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,967 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). In the decision in Wyeth below, the Vermont Supreme Court did 
not defer to the FDA’s view, concluding that the state law failure-to-warn claim at issue was 
clearly not preempted by the relevant federal statute and thus the FDA’s position failed 
Chevron step one. Levine, 944 A.2d at 192–93. 
 87. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005–06 (2008). 
 88. Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1007–09, 1011. On the same day as it decided Riegel, the Court also upheld 
preemption claims in two other cases, neither involving actions by federal agencies. See Rowe v. 
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987 
(2008). The Court additionally affirmed, by an equally divided court, a Second Circuit decision 
holding that a state tort suit against an FDA-approved drug was not preempted. Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (mem.), aff’g by an equally divided Court Desiano 
v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). The suit had been brought under a 
Michigan statute that granted drug manufacturers immunity against product liability suits for 
drugs receiving FDA approval and marketed in compliance with FDA requirements, unless the 
manufacturer intentionally withheld or misrepresented information that would have affected 
the FDA’s approval. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 2946(5) (2003). The Second Circuit had held that 
suit under this exception was distinguishable from “fraud on the FDA” claims that the Supreme 
Court had previously ruled preempted in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 
341, 348 (2001). Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 94–96 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 90. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 1009 (majority opinion). 
 92. Id. at 1009–10. 
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the case to displace otherwise applicable administrative law. But it is 
hard to read much into these passing invocations, as the decision 
plainly turned on the Justices’ independent assessment of the MDA’s 
import and not on the position of the FDA. Indeed, Riegel reinforces 
the impression that the Court is not approaching these cases with an 
eye to the relationship of federalism and administrative law writ 
large, but instead is focused on the details of the specific statutory and 
regulatory schemes at issue. 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE 
Six decisions are too few in number to do more than hint at 
possible trends in the Court’s understanding of how federalism and 
administrative law intersect. This is particularly true of decisions such 
as Massachusetts and Oregon, given their highly politicized content 
and the evident perception by the majority in each of egregious 
agency overreaching. Watters and ADEC, by contrast, demonstrate 
the Justices’ willingness to uphold what they view as more reasonable 
agency positions, whereas Raich’s invocations of administrative 
rescheduling are largely window dressing on a strong affirmation of 
national power. From one perspective then, these are highly fact-
bound decisions with limited general import. Moreover, a striking 
feature of all six decisions is the largely undeveloped nature of the 
Court’s analysis. In none did the Court offer an account of the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law that went 
beyond the case at hand. Indeed, as the comparisons above suggest, 
the decisions at times appear almost inconsistent in approach, 
particularly in the degree to which the Court gave weight to state 
sovereignty concerns. Hence, it seems fair to say that the Court has 
yet to arrive at a coherent understanding of what the relationship 
between federalism and administrative law should be. 
Nonetheless, these decisions share some common if inchoate 
themes. One is their unwillingness to curb congressional regulatory 
authority, whether by means of straightforward constitutional 
federalism restrictions or subconstitutional federalism doctrines 
requiring clear authorization for federal agency action that 
substantially impacts the states. Another is their recurrent reliance on 
administrative law as a vehicle for addressing federalism concerns. 
Whether the Court is intentionally using administrative law in this 
way is unclear. But at least as a practical matter, in these decisions 
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administrative law operates to mitigate the impact of federal agency 
decisions on the states and to protect the states against federal agency 
overreaching. This use of administrative law as a vehicle for 
addressing federalism concerns is obscured in the current debate over 
administrative preemption, which tends to underscore the tensions 
between federalism and administrative law rather than their potential 
symbiosis. 
A. Administrative Law as the New Federalism 
1. The Absence of Constitutional Federalism Curbs on Congress.  
An important initial point to note is the Court’s unwillingness to curb 
congressional regulatory authority on constitutional federalism 
grounds. This unwillingness is most apparent in Raich, with its 
deference to Congress on the question of what constitutes the 
relevant class of activities against which a Commerce Clause 
challenge is assessed, its broad definition of economic activity, and its 
lack of concern with protecting state regulatory experiments.93 Little 
will fall outside of Congress’ regulatory purview under Raich.94 No 
doubt, some measures may go too far in regulating intrastate 
activity,95 and constraints such as the anticommandeering rule96 and 
 
 93. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005); see also Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing 
Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 33–37 (critiquing Raich’s failure to take state experimentation seriously). 
 94. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Raich’s 
deference to congressional class of activity determinations transformed the decisions in United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which 
had upheld commerce power challenges, into “nothing more than a drafting guide” that warned 
Congress about the consequences of regulating too narrowly). Others have expressed similar 
views of Raich. See Jonathan Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) 
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 762–66 (2005); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: 
Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 513–19 
(2006); see also Young, supra note 93, at 38–40 (arguing that “[o]ne can identify plausible 
federal statutes . . . that would be exceptionally hard to justify on any of the theories offered in 
Raich,” but adding that “Raich most likely marks the outer bound of the Court’s ambition in 
Commerce Clause cases” and that “[a] rollback of the national regulatory state was never in the 
cards”). 
 95. Cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (finding that federal 
jurisdiction over “ephemeral flows of water” under the CWA “stretches the outer limits of 
Congress’s commerce power” and would require a clearer statement from Congress); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
172–73 (2001) (limiting federal jurisdiction under the CWA to navigable waters to avoid 
Commerce Clause issues). 
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protections for state sovereign immunity97 will continue to apply to 
congressional exercises of the commerce power. Nonetheless, Raich 
establishes that the expansive view of the commerce power, in place 
since the New Deal, will largely continue to govern.98 The other five 
decisions echo this same theme; in none did the Court suggest that 
Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting the 
regulatory scheme in question. Indeed, even the Watters and ADEC 
dissents agreed that Congress had power to authorize federal 
agencies to preempt state action or review state administrative 
determinations.99 
This lack of constitutional curbs on congressional regulatory 
authority is hardly unique to these six decisions. The Court has 
signaled similar reluctance to limit other forms of congressional 
power, in particular the spending power and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, that underlie many federal regulatory programs.100 
Equally important, in its 2001 decision in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations101 the Court refused to curtail Congress’s ability 
to delegate power broadly to administrative agencies, stating it has 
 
 96. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 97. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
64–66, 72–73 (1996). 
 98. Nor will the Court’s recent changes in membership likely effect this conclusion, given 
that Justices Kennedy and Scalia both voted to uphold congressional power in Raich. Raich, 125 
S. Ct. 2198, 2209 (majority opinion); id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 99. The Watters dissent is clearest on this, rejecting out of hand Michigan’s suggestion that 
granting federal agencies the power of preemption violated the Tenth Amendment. See Watters 
v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1585 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy 
was more oblique in ADEC, in particular noting constitutional limits on the commerce power 
such as the anticommandeering rule, but ultimately he too appears to accept that Congress’s 
“vast legislative authority” would allow it to authorize federal agency review of state agency and 
state court determinations. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 
512–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As discussed above, three Justices in Raich did assert 
that application of the CSA to personal medical use and cultivation of marijuana was outside 
Congress’s power. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 100. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (upholding a federal bribery statute 
that covers any employee of an entity that receives more than $10,000 in federal funds, including 
a state or local government, under the spending power and Necessary and Proper Clause); see 
also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (plurality opinion) (discussing 
the federal government’s ability to broadly impose conditions on federal grants). The Court has 
been much more willing to impose limits on Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but the commerce power is far more important to the modern federal 
administrative state. 
 101. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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“‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the 
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying the law.’”102 To be sure, the scope of 
congressional delegations is still subject to scrutiny, as Oregon 
demonstrates, but critically such scrutiny focuses on issues of 
statutory interpretation rather than constitutional limits on Congress. 
Congress’s constitutional ability to delegate broadly is accepted, and 
judicial inquiry centers instead on determining whether Congress in 
fact did so.103 
2. The Absence of Subconstitutional Federalism Doctrines.  
Interestingly, in the six decisions the Court also eschewed overt 
reliance on subconstitutional federalism doctrines, such as the 
presumption against preemption or clear statement requirements.104 
Often dubbed “process federalism,” these doctrines represent a 
subconstitutional form of federalism in that they seek to protect states 
from federal incursions not by means of direct constitutional limits on 
congressional authority, but rather through federalism-inspired 
canons of statutory construction.105 The extent to which these 
doctrines, in particular the presumption against preemption, actually 
 
 102. Id. at 474–75 (2001) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 103. Constitutional concerns may, however, inform the Court’s approach in determining 
how a delegation of authority is read. In particular, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the 
Court’s unwillingness to enforce constitutional restrictions on delegation has not meant the 
death of nondelegation doctrine, but rather its relocation to the field of statutory interpretation, 
wherein concerns about the scope of authority wielded by administrative agencies are addressed 
through a series of “nondelegation canons” of construction. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000). 
 104. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (clear statement requirement 
before Congress will be read as regulating the states); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (clear statement requirement for abrogating state sovereign immunity); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (conditions on state receipt of 
federal funds must be clearly stated); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
(presumption against preemption). 
 105. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636–37 (1992); see also 
Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1357–61, 1386–90 
(2001) (describing process federalism and emphasizing its status as a form of constitutional 
review). For further discussion of process federalism, see infra notes 257–59 and accompanying 
text. 
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drive judicial decisionmaking is a matter of some debate.106 In its 
recent preemption jurisprudence the Court has often taken a 
“freewheeling” approach to preemption,107 not even requiring a clear 
and direct conflict between federal and state law but instead 
upholding preemption claims based on the determination that state 
law would be an obstacle to achieving the underlying purposes of 
federal regulation.108 On the other hand, the Court invokes some of its 
other federalism canons more consistently, such as the requirements 
that conditions on federal funds and abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity must be clearly stated.109 
None of these subconstitutional federalism doctrines surfaced in 
the federalism–administrative law sextet, despite the fact that 
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate was for the most part 
unquestioned, precisely the context in which such doctrines are 
designed to operate. In Watters, for example, the majority found 
preemption based on a pragmatic assessment of the impact of state 
involvement on the federal regulatory scheme. The majority never 
referred to the presumption against preemption, notwithstanding the 
dissent’s insistence that the presumption should have been 
determinative.110 The absence of the federalism canons in Oregon is 
especially noteworthy, given that the canons had provided one of the 
 
 106. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 118–20, 122, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 107. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369. 
 108. See id. at 362–68; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1372 (2006); Young, supra note 4, at 30–32, 130–34. For 
a discussion of different forms of preemption, see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of 
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2100–12 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 
226–31 (2000). As many have noted, the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, particularly relating 
to preemption of state tort law, is marked by inconsistencies. See, e.g., Dinh, supra, at 2085; Jack 
Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178; Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17–36 (2007); Nelson, supra, at 233. Although generally expansive in its 
preemption inquiry in recent years, the Court has also occasionally read the preemptive effect 
of federal statutes more narrowly. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 
1801–02 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 40–41. 
 109. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 
(2006); Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). 
 110. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1579, 1585–86 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Similarly, in his ADEC dissent, Justice Kennedy argued to no avail that “the Court 
should at least insist upon a clear instruction from Congress” before finding that the EPA had 
power to oversee state BACT determinations. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. 
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 513 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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bases on which the Ninth Circuit below had invalidated the attorney 
general’s interpretive rule.111 By contrast, the Supreme Court viewed 
the challenge solely through an administrative law lens, holding that it 
was “unnecessary even to consider” application of such federalism-
inspired canons to conclude that the CSA did not delegate to the 
attorney general the authority that he claimed.112 
I believe the Court’s general failure to invoke such federalism 
doctrines in these decisions reflects (at least in part) the fact that the 
decisions involved agency-administered statutes. Canons of 
constructions that require Congress to speak clearly whenever it is 
authorizing an agency to restrict state regulatory authority or 
otherwise substantially burden the states, even if justifiable on 
federalism grounds, stand in sharp contrast to the Court’s usual 
approach to agency delegations. As Whitman demonstrates, the Court 
ordinarily does not require Congress to clearly specify the bounds of 
administrative authority, and it usually reads delegations of agency 
rulemaking authority quite generously.113 Chevron epitomizes this 
generous stance, with its identification of ambiguities and gaps in 
agency-administered statutes as implicit delegations.114 Moreover, in a 
world of concurrent authority, restrictions on state regulation and 
activity seem a predictable and common result of broad delegations 
of implementing authority to federal agencies—and thus hard to view 
as categorically outside of Congress’s contemplation.115 
 
 111. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 112. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006). But see Gersen, supra note 34, at 207 
(arguing that, in effect, the Oregon majority relied on a modified presumption against 
preemption that focuses on whether Congress has delegated authority to preempt state law). 
 113. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: 
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 471–73 (2002) (noting that grants of authority 
to agencies to adopt rules and regulations are read broadly as including power to issue rules 
with the force of law, although criticizing this practice as at odds with original congressional 
understandings). A recent example of such a generous reading is AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), in which the Court relied on a general grant of rulemaking authority 
to authorize the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to issue rules governing state 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, notwithstanding that the effect was to 
subject the states to federal agency oversight in a traditional area of state control and concern, 
id. at 377–85; see also id. at 402–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (documenting the states’ 
longstanding role in regulating intrastate communications). 
 114. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
 115. In this regard, federalism canons of construction may differ from other nondelegation 
canons, such as requirements that Congress speak clearly before agencies will be deemed 
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3. Administrative Law as a Federalism Vehicle.  The Court’s 
unwillingness to impose constitutional or subconstitutional federalism 
limits on Congress does not mean a lack of concern with the 
implications of federal regulatory action for the states. On the 
contrary, such concern surfaces repeatedly in the six decisions, in 
challenges to federal agency action as well as in more traditional 
federalism contexts such as preemption litigation. Critically, however, 
the Court chose to address its federalism concerns from within the 
broad analytic rubric of administrative law rather than through more 
straightforward federalism doctrines. 
The contrast between Raich and Oregon is singularly illustrative 
of this point. Although unsympathetic in Raich to claims that the 
CSA exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority, the Court 
proceeded in Oregon to give voice to concerns about the impact of 
the CSA on the states through its administrative law analysis. This 
reliance on administrative law in lieu of constitutional law helps 
explain the striking change in position of many of the Justices 
between Raich and Oregon.116 It also sparked a plaintive complaint 
 
authorized to apply statutes retroactively or extraterritorially, which Professor Cass Sunstein 
has maintained are used to narrow agency delegations. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 331–35 
(listing these and other examples). Sunstein identifies the principle that “administrative agencies 
will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous provisions so as to preempt state law” as one such 
canon, id. at 331, but evidence of such a principle in current case law is lacking, as demonstrated 
by the continuing debate over administrative preemption, see infra note 177 (collecting cases); 
see also AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 378 n.6, 397 (rejecting the claim that a presumption against 
preemption should apply against the FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction to regulate state 
commission implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the grounds that with the 
Act, Congress “unquestionably” had limited state control over local telecommunications, and 
arguing that ambiguities in the statute should yield deference to the agency’s views of its 
jurisdiction under Chevron). The Court recently invoked a federalism-inspired clear statement 
rule in an administrative context in Nixon v. Mo. Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). But 
Nixon stands out from the mine run of most administrative action in that the case addressed 
whether a federal statute preempted a state’s regulation of local governments, rather than its 
regulation of private parties—a feature that had led even the federal agency involved, the FCC, 
to conclude that clear evidence of a congressional desire to preempt was required. Id. at 130–31, 
141. 
 116. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all supported the claims of 
federal power in Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2209 (2005), and rejected them in Oregon, 126 S. 
Ct. 904, 910, 925 (2006), whereas Justice Thomas rejected the claim of federal power in Raich, 
125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting), and 
upheld it in Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Justice Scalia was the lone member to affirm federal power in both cases, see id; 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), and Justice O’Connor was the 
only one to vote against federal power on both occasions, see Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 910, 925; 
Raich, 126 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented in 
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from Justice Thomas, who remarked in Oregon that though he was 
sympathetic to the federalism argument, “that is now water over the 
dam. The relevance of such considerations was at its zenith in 
Raich. . . . [but such] considerations have little, if any relevance 
where, as here, we are merely presented with a question of statutory 
interpretation, and not the extent of constitutionally permissible 
federal power.”117 
Yet given the constitutional backdrop outlined earlier in this 
Section, the Court’s move to addressing federalism concerns through 
an administrative law framework makes sense. Administrative law 
offers a means by which the Court can raise such concerns while still 
respecting Congress’s ultimate regulatory authority. Under an 
administrative law framework, the Court’s scrutiny targets not 
Congress but federal agencies. The central question is whether a 
federal agency has overstepped its boundaries—whether by 
exercising broader authority than Congress delegated, violating 
statutory requirements, ignoring procedural mandates, or failing to 
adequately justify its decisions. Indeed, in the administrative law 
context the courts can position themselves as faithful agents of 
Congress, enforcing legislative will against a recalcitrant executive 
branch. Moreover, scrutinizing federal agency determinations is an 
activity in which federal courts frequently engage and for which they 
can draw on an established body of doctrine that also applies outside 
of federalism contexts. 
The decisions are less clear about exactly how administrative law 
serves as a vehicle for advancing federalism concerns. Two seemingly 
distinct models emerge. In one, the Court stays well within the 
contours of “ordinary” administrative law, with the connection to 
federalism lying simply in the fact that application of standard 
doctrines redounds—or might redound—to the benefit of the states. 
In the other, the Court appears to be giving federalism concerns 
special salience in its administrative law analysis, deviating from 
standard doctrines in ways that help protect states against federal 
agency overreaching. This divergence in approach makes it difficult to 
reach any firm conclusions about how the Court envisions 
administrative law’s federalism role—as well as about whether the 
 
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting), was not 
on the Court when Raich was decided. 
 117. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Court is consciously employing administrative law to address 
federalism concerns at all. Yet this divergence should not obscure the 
more important point, which is the dominance of administrative law 
paradigms instead of federalism doctrines in these decisions. Thus, 
whether or not the Court perceives administrative law as serving a 
federalism function, it is at least approaching these cases in a manner 
that allows administrative law to play such a role. 
B. Ordinary Administrative Law and Federalism 
The decisions are notable for their frequent invocation of 
ordinary administrative law principles. In particular, three standard 
features of administrative law surface repeatedly: an emphasis on 
administrative procedure, the requirement of reasoned 
decisionmaking, and doctrines for reviewing agency statutory 
interpretations. For the most part, these staples of administrative law 
analysis are not overtly connected to federalism. In practice, however, 
their application served the interests of the states involved. 
1. Administrative Procedure: Redress and Participation.  
Administrative procedure appears often in these decisions. In some 
cases, the procedures emphasized were administrative routes by 
which states could seek to alter federal requirements. Thus, for 
example, Raich emphasized the option of petitioning the attorney 
general to have marijuana removed from Schedule I and relisted as a 
Schedule II drug,118 and Massachusetts stressed that under the CAA 
Massachusetts had the right to petition the EPA to issue rules 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions.119 Similar emphasis on the 
importance of agency-level means of redress is evident in ADEC. 
There, the Court underscored that the EPA was willing to reconsider 
its rejection of ADEC’s BACT determination if the state submitted 
additional evidence, dismissing the dissent’s fears that this amounted 
to a “piling of process upon process.”120 
Administrative procedure also surfaces occasionally in these 
decisions as a means of ensuring state participation and consultation 
in federal agency decisions. Again ADEC is illustrative: the majority 
described in detail the EPA’s repeated communications with ADEC 
 
 118. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (majority opinion). 
 119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007). 
 120. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 n.21 (2004). 
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over the proposed permit and the BACT determination. These 
communications, it should be noted, were procedurally deficient and 
unnecessarily oblique.121 What appeared to matter more to the 
majority, however, was that the EPA had raised its concerns when the 
state agency was formulating the permit and had suggested specific 
ways that the state could satisfy them.122 By contrast, lack of 
consultation is a theme the Oregon majority returned to frequently, 
noting in particular that the attorney general failed to consult with 
Oregon notwithstanding Oregon’s express request to meet “with 
Department of Justice officials should the Department decide to 
revisit the application of the CSA to assisted suicide.”123 
Procedure—its use or nonuse—thus matters to the Court, 
especially the opportunities states enjoy to express their concerns to 
federal agencies and potentially obtain relief. The Court is not alone 
in emphasizing administrative procedure as a means of ensuring that 
federal agencies consider state interests. On occasion Congress has 
required that a federal agency engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or analogous participatory procedures before displacing 
state regulatory authority.124 Even more common are requirements 
that federal agencies consult with state and local officials in 
 
 121. The EPA submitted its first letter on the proposed permit outside the window of the 
public comment period, and appeared to act in response to points made by the National Park 
Service. See id. at 508 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And the majority itself characterized the EPA’s 
orders against the state agency and the facility involved as “skeletal” and “surely . . . not 
composed with ideal clarity.” Id. at 477–78, 497 (majority opinion). 
 122. See id. at 480, 493–94, 501. 
 123. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 913; see also id. at 922 (noting “the apparent absence of any 
consultation with anyone outside of the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned 
judgment” as a factor weighing against granting the attorney general’s views any deference). 
 124. See, e.g., Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 
U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000); 30 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2000) (requiring that the secretary of the interior 
provide for notice and hearing in the affected state before promulgating or implementing a 
federal program in lieu of state control under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act); 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), (d) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to preempt state law in certain 
contexts but requiring that the agency proceed using notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531–32, 1535 (2006) (requiring 
agencies to consider impacts on state, local, or tribal governments or the private sector for rules 
that might result in an annual expenditure of $100 million or more, and for such rules to 
consider alternatives and select the alternative that is “least costly, most cost-effective, or least 
burdensome” or explain why such an alternative was not chosen). On the UMRA’s effect, see 
Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript passim). 
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formulating policy.125 In like vein, Executive Order 13,132, which in 
substance dates back to President Reagan, imposes consultation and 
impact assessment requirements on agencies before they issue 
regulations with certain federalism implications.126 A separate 
executive order requires that regulations “specif[y] in clear language, 
the preemptive effect, if any,” they are to be given.127 
Yet the six decisions give little guidance as to why exactly 
administrative procedure matters from a federalism perspective. Only 
in Massachusetts did the Court expressly draw a connection between 
procedure and federalism, with the majority emphasizing that 
Massachusetts was seeking to assert its statutory procedural rights in 
arguing that the state was “entitled to special solicitude in our 
standing analysis.”128 By contrast, the Raich majority insisted that the 
administrative rescheduling procedure had “no relevance” to its 
assessment of the federalism challenge raised there.129 Moreover, the 
Raich majority nowhere mentioned that the rescheduling route was 
available to the state of California (as opposed to the individual 
plaintiffs in the case), which would have more clearly indicated an 
intent to use administrative procedures to alleviate federalism 
tensions. In ADEC and Oregon, meanwhile, use or nonuse of 
procedures appears to factor primarily in the Court’s assessment of 
the reasonableness of the agency actions at stake, rather than 
providing an independent basis for invalidation of agency action. 
 
 125. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8508 (2006) (unemployment compensation regulations); 15 U.S.C.  
§ 717b-1(b) (2006) (siting of natural gas facilities); 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512, 3312 (2006) (dispute 
settlements under GATT and NAFTA); 21 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (implementation of national 
drug control policy); see also Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254. 
 126. See Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, 3 
C.F.R. 206, 209–10 (2006) (requiring, “to the extent practicable and permitted by law,” that an 
agency submit an impact statement whenever a proposed regulation has federalism implications 
and imposes substantial direct compliance costs on states that are not statutorily required or 
preempts state law). Executive Order No. 13,132 also emphasizes the importance of early 
consultation with state and local officials and of federal agencies’ relying on state standards and 
regulation in policymaking generally. See id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 208. 
 127. See Exec. Order No. 12,988 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 157 (1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(2000); see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) 
(requiring agencies to “respect the role of State, local, and tribal governments” by, when 
feasible, consulting states before imposing federal regulatory requirements and seeking to 
minimize those burdens). 
 128. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454–55 (2007). 
 129. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 n.37 (2005). 
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The lack of emphasis on notice-and-comment rulemaking further 
complicates efforts to understand the role procedure plays in these 
decisions. Unlike other recent administrative law precedent in which 
such rulemaking is given central importance,130 in these decisions the 
Court put little weight on its use (in Watters and Massachusetts) or its 
nonuse (in Oregon, ADEC, and Riegel). Yet, as discussed in greater 
depth in Part III.A,131 notice-and-comment rulemaking seems 
particularly conducive to ensuring that states can force federal 
agencies to respond to their concerns. The lack of emphasis on it in 
these decisions is thus surprising. 
2. Reasoned Decisionmaking. More “substantive” 
administrative law doctrine also features prominently in these 
decisions.132 Perhaps the most fundamental substantive administrative 
law demand is that an agency must engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking—in the Court’s words, an agency must “examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.”133 The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking 
appears in some form in all but one of six decisions.134 Even 
 
 130. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350–51 (2007); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). 
 131. See infra text accompanying notes 219–30. 
 132. Some would classify what I am calling substantive dimensions of administrative law—
the reasoned decisionmaking demand and deference doctrines—as procedural. See, e.g., Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 
1760, 1765 (2007). Probably the most accurate characterization is to acknowledge that these 
administrative law requirements are both substantive and procedural: substantive, because their 
most direct target is the substance of an agency’s decisions; procedural, because scrutiny of 
substance will indirectly affect an agency’s procedural choices and because in some cases the 
strength of scrutiny turns on the procedures an agency used. Indeed, substance and procedure 
are rarely far apart in administrative law. My intent in classifying these aspects of administrative 
law as substantive is simply to contrast them with instances wherein the courts focus more 
directly on procedures, not to deny they also have procedural implications. 
 133. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134. The exception is Watters. The omission of reference to the reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement reflects Watters’s status as a preemption suit against state agency action rather than 
a challenge to federal agency action, and the fact that Watters was decided on Chevron step one 
grounds based on the Court’s independent reading of the statutory provisions involved, with the 
Court insisting that it was not relying on the agency’s views. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 
127 S. Ct. 1559, 1566, 1572 (2007). 
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Massachusetts, which focused primarily on questions of statutory 
interpretation, repeatedly criticized the EPA on this front, concluding 
that the EPA had “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to 
decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate 
change.”135 The majority’s willingness to rely on this ground is 
particularly striking given that the case arose out of a rulemaking 
petition denial, a context in which agency policy choices usually 
receive great deference.136 Reasoned decisionmaking is also an 
important underlying theme in ADEC, in which the majority 
repeatedly characterized the EPA’s actions in terms traditionally 
associated with reasoned agency determinations.137 
Here too, the decisions do not expressly link application of the 
reasoned decisionmaking requirement to federalism. Raich perhaps 
comes closest, with the majority’s suggestion that marijuana’s 
continued listing as a Schedule I drug under the CSA might be 
arbitrary at the same time as it rejected a straightforward federalism 
challenge to the CSA.138 Nonetheless, in practice, application of this 
 
 135. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007); see also id. at 1463 (arguing that 
factors identified by the EPA do not “amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a 
scientific judgment” and that “[i]f the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA 
from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global 
warming, EPA must say so”). Oregon is more devoted to parsing statutory text than 
Massachusetts, yet here too the Court makes note of factors traditionally associated with 
reasoned decisionmaking—consistency, coherence, thoroughness, expertise, openness to 
contrary views—in finding that the attorney general’s interpretation did not merit deference 
under Skidmore. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922 (2006). In Riegel, the reasoned 
decisionmaking requirement’s appearance was far more fleeting, reflecting that like Watters the 
case did not involve a direct challenge to an agency action and the Court insisted it was not 
relying on the agency’s views. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005–06, 1011 (2008). 
Even so, the Court noted in passing that it found the FDA’s reading of one of its own 
regulations “less than compelling” and that inconsistency in the agency’s views might undercut 
any deference due. Id. at 1010. 
 136. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459; see infra text accompanying note 148. 
 137. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 486, 487–91 
(2004) (emphasizing the cogency and consistency of the EPA’s interpretation as well as the 
limited authority the EPA claimed); id. at 495–502 (determining that the EPA’s rejection of 
Alaska’s BACT determination was not arbitrary and capricious). 
 138. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 n.37 (2005). The Court’s 2002 decision in New 
York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002), offered an even more direct linkage between reasoned 
decisionmaking requirements and federalism, with the Court invoking federalism implications 
in support of the agency’s policy choice. The Court there ruled that even if FERC could assert 
jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, the agency’s discretionary choice not to do so in 
part because of the “implication for the States’ regulation of retail sales” was justified. Id. at 27–
28. 
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basic administrative law demand served to protect state interests by 
guarding against federal agency overreaching at the states’ expense. 
This dynamic is evident in ADEC, even though the state was not 
successful on its claims; there, the majority emphasized that the 
federal courts were available to protect states against inequitable 
agency conduct and then reviewed the basis for the EPA’s decision 
fairly closely before sustaining it.139 
The lack of a more overt connection between the reasoned 
decisionmaking requirement and state interests again leaves a 
number of questions unanswered. Most importantly, does the fact 
that an agency decision will substantially intrude on the states lead to 
a higher burden of justification or greater scrutiny of the decision’s 
underlying basis? Or to put the point in the context of Raich, does the 
fact that a number of states have legalized medical use of marijuana 
mean that the attorney general’s refusal to reschedule it deserves 
more searching scrutiny than lower courts had so far applied?140 The 
majority perhaps suggested as much by reaching out to call into 
question marijuana’s Schedule I status, but it never said so directly. 
3. Statutory Interpretation Doctrines.  Equally evident in these 
decisions is reliance on general administrative law doctrines regarding 
when agency statutory interpretations trigger deference. Oregon is 
the most prominent example here, with the majority insisting that 
“familiar principles” guided its inquiry into the degree of deference 
due the attorney general’s interpretive rule.141 But all the decisions 
employed standard doctrinal frameworks to some extent in their 
assessments of the merits of agency statutory interpretations. Thus, in 
current administrative law parlance, Oregon is a Chevron step zero 
determination because it focuses on determining whether the 
attorney general was delegated authority to act with legal force on the 
question of acceptable medical practice.142 Massachusetts, Watters, and 
 
 139. See ADEC, 540 U.S. at 495–502. 
 140. If so, Raich may signal a willingness to subject agency reasoning to greater scrutiny 
than usual when it significantly burdens the states. See infra text accompanying note 166. 
 141. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–15 (2006). 
 142. Professor Cass Sunstein has characterized Mead as adding a new step zero to the 
Chevron framework. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 191 & n.20; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 
812–13 (2002). 
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Riegel, in turn, represent Chevron step one determinations.143 
Skidmore deference, the amorphous category of deference accorded 
agency statutory interpretations not qualifying for deference under 
Chevron, is invoked in ADEC, Oregon, and Riegel.144 Riegel also 
references the substantial deference ordinarily accorded an agency’s 
interpretations of its own rules.145 
Once again, however, no opinion expressly describes these 
standard deference doctrines as means for addressing federalism 
concerns. Here, it is Oregon that comes closest, with its invocation of 
federalism concerns as one reason not to defer, under either Chevron 
or Skidmore, to the attorney general’s interpretation of “legitimate 
medical purpose” as excluding assisted suicide.146 More importantly, 
in these decisions the Court subjected agency statutory 
interpretations to unusually searching scrutiny, despite its invocation 
of standard deference frameworks.147 Whether the Court was actually 
creating a distinct approach to reviewing agency statutory 
interpretations for use when agency interpretations substantially 
impact the states is a question I discuss in the next Section. But that 
possibility does not remove the significance of the fact that the Court 
 
 143. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (finding preemption clearly 
mandated by the text of the MDA); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459–62 (2007) 
(concluding that the CAA unambiguously includes carbon dioxide as an air pollutant and that 
the EPA’s policy reasons for refusing to regulate carbon dioxide conflict with “the clear terms” 
of the CAA); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 (2007) (holding that the 
NBA itself preempts state law and thus the question of deference to the OCC’s view did not 
arise). Even ADEC, notwithstanding its statement that Chevron did not apply (and its 
subsequent references to the reasonableness of the EPA’s view of an ambiguous provision) has 
a step one air, with language suggesting the majority believed the EPA’s interpretation was the 
only plausible reading of the statute: 
We fail to see why Congress, having expressly endorsed an expansive surveillance 
role for EPA in two independent CAA provisions, would then implicitly preclude the 
Agency from verifying substantive compliance with the BACT provisions and, 
instead, limit EPA’s superintendence to the insubstantial question whether the state 
permitting authority had uttered the key words “BACT.” 
ADEC, 540 U.S. at 490. 
 144. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (noting that Skidmore deference would apply were the statute 
ambiguous); Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 921–22; ADEC, 540 U.S. at 487–88, 493, 496. The ADEC 
majority itself did not expressly invoke Skidmore, but cited to other recent precedent that did 
so. See id. at 488 (citing Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)). 
 145. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009. For discussions of how this same deference doctrine 
surfaced (or not) in Oregon, see infra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 146. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 921–25. 
 147. See infra text accompanying notes 151–66. 
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is invoking standard administrative law doctrines for reviewing 
agency statutory interpretations. At a minimum, this reinforces the 
point that the Court sees these decisions predominantly through an 
administrative law rubric, notwithstanding their federalism 
implications. 
C. Special Federalism-Inspired Administrative Law 
Ordinary administrative law thus surfaces regularly in these 
decisions and generally operates to protect state interests, whether or 
not states prove victorious on their claims. Yet the Court’s failure to 
expressly link federalism to federal administrative law raises the 
possibility that this state-protective impact was unintended by the 
Court. Moreover, as several of these decisions took the form of 
administrative law challenges to federal agency action, the dominance 
of administrative law in the decisions is not surprising. Hence, 
although the connections between federalism and administrative law 
in these decisions are noteworthy, it remains open whether the Court 
is consciously using administrative law as a federalism surrogate. 
Stronger evidence that the Court may be seeking to address 
federalism concerns through administrative law comes from a number 
of instances in which the decisions give special weight to federalism 
concerns in their application of administrative law doctrines. The 
contrast between the decisions and the more usual application of 
these doctrines is striking, and federalism concerns appear to be what 
explains the variation. Yet although supporting the conclusion that 
the Court is using administrative law to protect state interests, it is 
less clear whether these examples portend development of a distinct 
form of administrative law for use when federal agency action raises 
serious federalism concerns. 
1. Massachusetts and Special Rules for State Standing.  The most 
readily ascertainable instance of the Court giving special weight to 
federalism concerns is Massachusetts’s suggestion of distinct standing 
rules for states. As noted in Part I.A, exactly what the majority 
intends by its invocation of “special solicitude” for the states in 
standing analysis is not obvious; such solicitude might mean a 
generous stance in determining whether the traditional trio of 
requirements for standing is met, or exempting the states from the 
traditional analysis altogether when their sovereignty interests are 
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implicated. What is plain, however, is the majority’s willingness to 
treat the states differently from other plaintiffs in challenging federal 
administrative action and to do so because of the states’ status as 
sovereign entities within the federal union. In short, Massachusetts 
seems to represent a federalism-inspired deviation from standard 
administrative law. 
Interestingly, however, the majority made no mention of 
federalism in addressing another administrative law issue centrally 
implicated in the case—the standard for reviewing denials of 
rulemaking petitions. Although the Court stated that review of 
rulemaking denials “is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential,’” it 
nonetheless took a fairly aggressive interpretive stance in concluding 
that section 202(a)(1) of the CAA prohibited the EPA from refusing 
to regulate carbon dioxide on general policy grounds.148 Moreover, the 
Court elsewhere has expressed concerns about subjecting agency 
nonenforcement decisions to judicial scrutiny.149 The majority could 
have justified undertaking more rigorous review of the rulemaking 
denial at issue with limited precedential impact by again invoking 
Massachusetts’s status as a sovereign state. Having lost its sovereign 
power to regulate through statutory preemption, Massachusetts 
arguably has a special right to demand review of whether the federal 
government’s refusal to act accords with the governing statute. That 
the majority did not make this argument raises a real question about 
the extent to which it intended to create a distinct administrative law 
to govern when federal action impinges on the states. 
2. Heightened Substantive Scrutiny to Protect State Interests.  
Aside from Massachusetts, none of the decisions expressly invoked 
 
 148. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007). For a defense of this assessment of 
Massachusetts’s statutory reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 151–53. 
 149. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). Review of rulemaking denials is 
somewhat different than review of other agency inaction, in particular agency refusal to take 
enforcement action in a specific case. Agencies must offer some explanation for denying a 
rulemaking petition and such denials are often accompanied by additional formalities—
including, when the agency seeks public comment on a rulemaking petition (as the EPA did in 
Massachusetts), the presence of an agency record. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459; Am. 
Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the practical effects of 
searching judicial review of rulemaking denials are quite similar: agencies potentially would 
need to devote substantial resources to justifying denials, and might be forced to undertake 
rulemakings that they deemed less pressing than others. For a discussion of how resource 
allocation is implicated by judicial review of agency action, see Eric Biber, The Importance of 
Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 16–51 (2008). 
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federalism as a reason to adopt new doctrinal rules. Yet most 
appeared to deviate from standard administrative law, in particular 
involving exceptionally searching scrutiny of governing statutes and 
agency decisionmaking.150 
Massachusetts is one example. Section 202(a)(1), the provision 
centrally at issue there, combines reference to the administrator’s 
judgment with mandatory language stating that the administrator 
shall set standards and seeming to significantly limit the grounds on 
which the administrator can refuse to do so.151 Although the majority’s 
interpretation of section 202(a)(1) as requiring that the administrator 
reach a judgment on whether to set standards based on particular 
factors may well be the best reading, it is hard to claim that the 
provision is not ambiguous regarding the extent of the agency’s 
discretion.152 Yet the Court reversed the agency on Chevron step one 
grounds, concluding that the agency’s interpretation was “divorced 
from the statutory text.”153 
 
 150. An exception is Riegel, in which eight Justices agreed that the MDA’s express 
preemption clause plainly required preemption of the state tort suit in question. See Riegel, 128 
S. Ct. at 1006–09; id. at 1011–12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing the clarity of statutory 
language as mandating preemption). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
 152. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 53, 93 (noting the ambiguity in section 
202(a)(1) regarding whether the administrator could refuse to make a judgment, and suggesting 
that the EPA’s claim for Chevron deference was stronger than that of the government agencies 
in Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), or FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120 (2000)); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 53, at 1041 (arguing that the Court’s 
“review of the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate . . . was meticulous and probing”). But 
see Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than 
Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermath, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 32, 36 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20/ 
LRColl2007n20Adler.pdf (arguing that the Court’s review of the EPA’s decision was not 
“particularly searching or severe”). 
 153. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462–63. The majority also rejected the EPA’s conclusion 
that carbon dioxide was not a pollutant on Chevron step one grounds, concluding “the statutory 
text forecloses EPA’s reading.” Id. at 1459–60. Here the Court’s determination of statutory 
clarity has more basis, for as the majority noted, see id., the statutory definition of air pollutant 
is extremely broad, see 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Yet viewing the definitional section in the context of 
the regulatory scheme as a whole arguably undermines this clarity somewhat. As Justice Scalia 
argued, the focus of the CAA regulatory scheme in general is on limiting ambient air pollutants 
whose presence in the air varies geographically. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1475–77 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); see also Adler, supra note 152, at 40 (noting the majority’s rejection in 
Massachusetts that “the NAAQS regulatory regime is fundamentally ill-suited to greenhouse 
gas control”); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 72 (“The NAAQS system does not seem 
workable for greenhouse gases in part because states could never ensure compliance with 
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The Court’s statutory analysis in Watters is another instance of an 
expansive Chevron step one inquiry. The authorization for operating 
subsidiaries in the NBA is oblique, resting on the statute’s grant of 
“incidental powers” and a separate statute’s distinction between 
financial subsidiaries and other subsidiaries.154 More importantly, 
accepting that the NBA authorized national banks’ use of operating 
subsidiaries, a point Michigan did not challenge, further inferences 
are required to conclude that the NBA authorizes the use of state-
chartered operating subsidiaries or displacement of state supervision 
of such subsidiaries. Notably, § 484(a), the NBA provision restricting 
state oversight powers, only refers expressly to national banks 
themselves.155 Perhaps, as the majority argued, the close identification 
of national banks and their operating subsidiaries (embodied in a 
statutory prescription that operating subsidiaries engage only in 
activities national banks can engage in and conduct such activities 
“subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of 
such activities by national banks”156) justifies reading § 484(a) as 
extending to operating subsidiaries. But that move is not textually 
mandated.157 Instead, as the appellate courts addressing the question 
had generally concluded, the NBA appears ambiguous on the 
question of whether states can exercise supervisory authority over 
state-chartered subsidiaries of national banks.158 
Oregon is a third example of the Court subjecting federal agency 
actions to unusually searching scrutiny. Notably, the requirement that 
prescriptions of controlled substances must serve a “legitimate 
medical purpose” was imposed by an earlier attorney general 
regulation and ordinarily administrative agencies’ interpretations of 
their own rules receive substantial deference.159 But the majority 
 
federally established concentration limits; those gases are emitted from many world-wide 
sources not under their control.”). 
 154. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2006). 
 155. Id. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as 
authorized by Federal law . . . .”). 
 156. Id. § 24a(g)(3)(A). 
 157. See id.; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570–72 (2007). 
 158. See Nat’l City Bank v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia 
Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315–18 (2d Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 
F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2005), aff’d 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 
419 F.3d 949, 959 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 159. E.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give 
substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”). Such deference 
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refused to grant deference here on the novel ground that the 
regulation at issue merely parroted statutory language.160 Similarly, 
the CSA expressly delegated authority to the attorney general to 
“promulgate rules and regulations . . . . relating to the registration and 
control of the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.”161 Such express 
delegations are usually read expansively, but the majority here was 
far less generous, concluding that the attorney general’s authority was 
limited to changing a substance’s classification schedule and guarding 
against diversion.162 In addition, the CSA authorizes the attorney 
general to deny, suspend, or revoke a physician’s registration if the 
registration is “inconsistent with the public interest.”163 Terms such as 
“the public interest” are frequently viewed as conveying broad 
policymaking authority—indeed, the more commonly voiced concern 
is that such a delegation leaves the responsible agency official 
essentially unconstrained in setting policy.164 The majority, however, 
viewed this provision narrowly and rejected Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s claim that the provision authorized him to determine that 
assisted suicide was not in the public interest.165 
Even Raich can be understood as an instance of unusually 
searching scrutiny of agency decisionmaking. No petition to 
 
today is often referred to as Auer deference, based on the decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 
452, 461 (1997). See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915 (2006). 
 160. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 915–16. Although perhaps a good reason not to grant deference, 
this antiparroting rule was not an established “familiar principle” but instead a creation of the 
Oregon majority. 
 161. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 871(b) (2000). 
 162. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 917. 
 163. 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)(4), 822(a)(2). 
 164. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 474–75 (2001) (noting the 
often-wide scope of authority given to agencies in determining the reach of statutory terms, 
including “statutes authorizing regulation in the public interest,” but emphasizing that even such 
broad delegations have been found to contain constitutionally required minima of an 
“intelligible principle” to guide agency discretion and thus are constitutional (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (considering the 
claim that “the standard of ‘public interest’ governing the exercise of the powers delegated to 
the Commission by Congress is so vague and indefinite that, if it be construed as 
comprehensively as the words alone permit, the delegation of legislative authority is 
unconstitutional,” but ultimately rejecting this argument). 
 165. Although deviating from administrative law precedent in these ways, the result in 
Oregon is nonetheless defensible as a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation. The 
attorney general’s broad assertion of power ill fits the CSA as a whole, which intended the 
secretary of HHS and the states to play a major role in regulating medical practice. Cf. 
Bressman, supra note 37, at 787 (arguing that Oregon could have been decided on Chevron step 
two grounds as representing an unreasonable agency interpretation). 
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reschedule marijuana was before the Court. Moreover, as the 
majority noted, prior challenges to the federal government’s refusal 
to reschedule marijuana had been rebuffed—not surprisingly, as the 
proper listing of marijuana would seem to be the type of 
determination requiring scientific expertise and touching on safety 
concerns to which the courts usually are quite deferential.166 Yet the 
Court went out of its way to suggest that the evidence of marijuana’s 
medicinal potential might require rescheduling. 
Not only did the Court undertake fairly exacting scrutiny in these 
decisions, its doing so appears driven in large part by federalism 
concerns.167 For example, the Watters majority’s reliance on 
independent scrutiny of the NBA instead of deferring to the OCC’s 
interpretation—particularly given that both approaches produced the 
same result—seems only explained as an effort to avoid the 
federalism implications of administrative preemption. And the 
Oregon majority was plainly concerned that the interpretive rule 
undermined the federal-state balance embodied in the CSA.168 
Similarly, it is hard to explain why the Court in Raich would suggest 
that marijuana’s listing as a Schedule I drug was unsupported except 
to signal that administrative relisting represented a means of 
navigating the specific federalism tensions in that case. 
Thus, the searching scrutiny in these decisions provides evidence 
that the Court is using administrative law analysis to address 
federalism concerns. But use of such scrutiny in these decisions does 
not clearly put them outside the pale of ordinary administrative law. 
Watters and Massachusetts are hardly alone in embodying vigorous 
 
 166. For example, the courts repeatedly refused to overturn the FAA’s Age Sixty Rule, 
despite their concerns about the agency’s continued adherence to the rule. See, e.g., Yetman v. 
Garvey, 261 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); Prof’l Pilots Fed. v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 769–70 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (upholding the FAA’s Age Sixty Rule). Congress recently enacted legislation raising 
the mandatory retirement age to sixty-five. Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. 
110-135, § 2(a), 121 Stat. 1450, 1450 (2007) (to be codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44729). 
 167. Massachusetts may be an exception; what seemed to be driving the Court in that 
decision were instead separation of powers concerns—specifically, the belief that the Bush 
administration was failing to comply with a clear congressional instruction because of its 
differing policy views. Of course, given the importance of representation of the states in 
Congress to the federalism system, it is not difficult to translate the Court’s insistence on the 
executive branch’s fidelity to congressional lawmaking into federalism terms. But it is not 
apparent from the decision, even with the reference to special state standing, that the Court 
itself did so. 
 168. For a similar assessment, see Gersen, supra note 34, at 245. 
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Chevron step one inquiries,169 and indeed the appropriate scope of 
step one has long been a source of debate.170 Courts also vary in the 
strength of their scrutiny of agency reasoning, often applying more 
intense “hard look” review to notice-and-comment rulemaking, the 
type of procedure involved in rescheduling decisions under the CSA 
and emissions setting under the CAA.171 Moreover, courts sometimes 
undertake more intensive scrutiny of agency decisionmaking when a 
basis exists to conclude that politics or ideology led an agency to 
ignore contrary facts.172 Nor, finally, has the Court only required 
detailed evidence of an agency’s authority to regulate in federalism 
contexts.173 In short, whatever its doctrinal formulae state, as a 
practical matter administrative law embraces a range of deference; 
 
 169. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000); 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–29 (1994). Brown & Williamson is a 
particularly interesting precursor to the Court’s approach in the federalism–administrative law 
decisions. As John Manning has argued, in Brown & Williamson the Court took a narrow view 
of the underlying statute, in part it appears out of constitutional nondelegation concerns 
regarding the breadth of authority asserted by the agency. See John F. Manning, The 
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 233–37. Yet the 
Court claimed to be operating within the Chevron framework. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
159. 
 170. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1264–67 (2007); Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, 
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 828–29, 838 n.26 (2006); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 207, 237–42. 
 171. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2000) (CSA); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2000) (CAA); infra note 292 
and accompanying text (commenting on the varying approaches taken by courts with respect to 
the “hard look” review). 
 172. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 
(1983) (suggesting that the agency may have been unduly swayed by the preferences of the 
automobile industry in the course of closely scrutinizing and rejecting the agency’s decision to 
repeal passive restraint requirements); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 87–89 
(viewing Massachusetts as hearkening back to a pre-Chevron vision of administrative law under 
which independence and expertise are prized over political accountability). On the relationship 
between law and politics in agency decisionmaking, see Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not 
the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of 
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 322, 335 (1990). 
 173. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60 (holding that the FDA lacked 
authority to regulate tobacco use, emphasizing that the FDA was “assert[ing] jurisdiction to 
regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy” and 
concluding that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and 
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”). 
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the divide between ordinary and extraordinary here is far from 
stark.174 
D. Administrative Preemption 
The current debate over administrative preemption merits 
special note, for it is in this context that the relationship between 
federalism and administrative law has surfaced most prominently. 
Doctrinally, it is well established that substantive requirements 
imposed by federal agencies, for example through legislative rules, 
can preempt state law.175 But disagreement exists over who should 
have primary authority to interpret the preemptive scope of agency 
rules or the statutes agencies are charged with implementing. 
Ordinarily, such agency interpretations would qualify for Chevron 
deference or its equivalent, assuming that the statute or rule at issue 
was ambiguous. However, the dramatic increase in agency 
interpretations of statutes and rules as broadly preempting state law 
(including state tort law)—a trend that became pronounced in 2006—
has led a number of scholars and jurists to conclude that agency 
preemption interpretations should receive more limited Skidmore 
deference or perhaps no deference at all.176 Put differently, they argue 
 
 174. For an empirical investigation documenting the range of deference the Court employs 
in reviewing agency statutory interpretations, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren 
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
 175. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154, 159–67 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 
381, 383 (1961). In the past, the power of agencies to preempt state law through their 
substantive enactments has also not been a source of much scholarly dispute. See, e.g., Nina A. 
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 753–55 (2004) [hereinafter 
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]. But see Clark, supra note 5, at 1342–46 (arguing that 
only laws adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 7 qualify as “Laws of the United States” for 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, a test that administrative regulations fail). More recently, 
however, some scholars have voiced concerns about agencies’ power to preempt state law even 
through their substantive enactments. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 698, 706 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson, A Presumption 
Against Agency Preemption]; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV 727 (2008). 
 176. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 740–42; Merrill, supra note 
175, at 775; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 491–98 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 869, 886–92 (2008). 
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for development of a special federalism-inspired deference doctrine 
for preemption contexts. 
Whether (and in what way) courts should defer to agency 
preemption determinations is the question the Court evaded in 
Watters. The Watters majority’s reliance on an expansive Chevron 
step one inquiry in lieu of deferring to the OCC might signal that 
these Justices, as well as the dissenters, had doubts about the 
appropriateness of Chevron deference in the preemption context.177 
On the other hand, the majority’s failure to acknowledge the unusual 
breadth of its statutory investigation may indicate some ambivalence 
about devising special administrative law doctrines to reflect 
federalism concerns. 
Although punting on this deference question, Watters and the 
other decisions in the federalism–administrative law sextet carry 
important implications for the administrative preemption debate. In 
particular, the decisions reveal the theoretical limitations of this 
debate, which tends to portray federalism and ordinary administrative 
law as inherently in conflict. One effect is to downplay the possibility 
that administrative law could serve as a means of reinforcing 
federalism—and vice versa.178 Although tensions exist between 
 
 177. On several prior occasions the Court has similarly avoided taking a position on the 
level of deference due agency interpretations, although specific Justices have voiced positions. 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883–86 (2000) (stating that the Department of 
Transportation’s position that a federal regulatory standard preempted the state tort action at 
issue should be accorded “some weight,” but holding deference unnecessary to conclude that 
preemption was appropriate); id. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference to 
agency views raised for the first time in a legal brief is inappropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996) (stating that its determination that a statute did not preempt state 
tort claims was “substantially informed” by federal regulations and that the agency’s views of 
the statute should be given “substantial weight”); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing 
that agencies should have “a degree of leeway” to determine the preemptive effect of 
ambiguous statutes); id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is not certain that an agency 
regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference.”); 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (assuming arguendo that the question 
of whether a statute is preemptive “must always be decided de novo by the courts”). 
 178. Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld are exceptions here, with their emphasis 
on the way that judicial scrutiny can reinforce agency attentiveness to federalism concerns. See 
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and 
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1922, 1995–99 (2008); see also Kenneth A. 
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116782 
(emphasizing the importance of “provid[ing] incentives for robust norm-protection by agencies 
in the first instance”). In addition, Professor Richard Nagareda has argued that concerns about 
a regulatory scheme’s impact on the states could be used to reinforce the quality and efficacy of 
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federalism and administrative law mindsets, the six decisions 
demonstrate that the relationship between these two doctrinal lines is 
much more complicated than one of straightforward conflict. 
The decisions additionally suggest that the administrative 
preemption debate is unduly narrow insofar as it focuses specifically 
on the appropriateness of granting Chevron deference to agency 
preemption interpretations. Such a focus ignores the opportunities for 
addressing federalism concerns within the full Chevron inquiry, which 
includes investigation of an agency’s delegated authority at step zero 
(as in Oregon) and independent assessment of statutory meaning at 
step one (as in Massachusetts, Watters, and Riegel). It similarly 
overlooks the potential for ensuring that agencies are attentive to the 
impact of their decisions on the states through arbitrary and 
capriciousness review (as in ADEC and Raich). The Chevron focus 
additionally means that the administrative preemption debate centers 
on judicial review, when other mechanisms, such as procedural 
requirements on agencies or structuring federal programs to 
incorporate reliance on state administration, may well prove better 
means of ensuring that federalism concerns are incorporated into 
federal agency decisionmaking.179 
Finally, the focus on administrative preemption also obscures the 
fact that such preemption is simply one of several instances in which 
administrative law and federalism intersect. Why, for example, should 
courts deny deference to express agency assessments of a statute’s 
preemptive scope but then defer to agency substantive 
determinations that restrict state regulatory choices? Such a 
bifurcated approach would simply provide agencies with an incentive 
to achieve preemption impact through substantive requirements 
imposed by legislative rules instead of statutory interpretations.180 
One alternative would be to apply similar restrictions whenever 
federal agency action preempts state authority. Some scholars adopt 
 
federal regulation. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the 
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. art. 4, 6 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/ 
iss1/art4 (stating that “the real concern over FDA preemption is not the broad-brush one that it 
would shut off tort litigation but, more precisely, that it might do so for too little in return” and 
arguing that tort preemption concerns should be repackaged as arguments for forcing 
information disclosure to the FDA). 
 179. See Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1565–66. 
 180. Recognition of this potential for manipulation has led my colleague Professor Tom 
Merrill to argue for an approach that limits agency power to preempt through substantive 
determinations as well as through interpretations. See Merrill, supra note 175, at 773–75. 
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this view, arguing that agencies’ ability to issue preemptive 
determinations—interpretive or substantive—should be limited to 
instances in which Congress has clearly and specifically granted them 
that authority.181 But such an approach would create extraordinary 
obstacles to federal administrative governance. Given the overlapping 
character of federal and state regulatory power, most substantive 
determinations by federal agencies hold the potential to displace state 
law; nor does it seem likely that clear congressional authorization 
frequently exists for agency actions to have this preemptive effect. 
Hence, this approach could threaten much of the deference currently 
accorded substantive agency determinations. At a minimum, 
determining whether such a radical change is justified requires 
situating administrative preemption against a full assessment of the 
relationship between federalism and administrative law. 
III.  ASSESSING THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE 
The discussion heretofore has focused on establishing that the 
Court is increasingly attentive to the relationship between federalism 
and administrative law, and further, that it may be using 
administrative law as a vehicle by which to address federalism 
concerns raised by federal administrative action. I now switch focus 
and assess how well suited administrative law is to playing this role. 
Two questions are central to such an assessment. First, how likely is 
administrative law to be an adequate means of advancing federalism 
concerns? Second, is it legitimate for the Court to advance state 
interests through administrative law, particularly if it is not willing to 
impose direct constitutional limits on the scope of federal authority? 
A. Is Administrative Law an Adequate Vehicle for Addressing 
Federalism Concerns? 
Assessing whether federal administrative law can offer adequate 
protection to state regulatory interests necessitates an account of 
what adequate protection of such interests entails. In particular, does 
adequacy here require success in derailing proposed administrative 
 
 181. Id. at 767 (arguing for a “super-strong clear statement rule” before “permit[ting] 
agencies to preempt on their own authority”). This also is Professor Nina Mendelson’s view. See 
Mendelson, Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 700–01 (arguing for a 
presumption against agency preemption). 
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actions that adversely impact the states, or is it sufficient to ensure 
that state regulatory interests receive careful consideration by federal 
officials? Although a lack of any bottom-line success would call into 
question the ability of administrative law to offer meaningful 
protection to federalism concerns, success cannot be the only 
criterion. Such a measure is too much at odds with the basic 
presumption underlying the administrative law approach, namely that 
Congress has constitutional authority to regulate an activity even at 
the cost of preempting or otherwise burdening the states. Instead, the 
focus here, as with process federalism, necessarily must be on 
ensuring that federal officials adequately consider and justify 
decisions that harm state interests, not that they forego such decisions 
altogether. 
How well, then, does administrative law function in ensuring 
sufficient agency consideration of the state interests in playing a 
regulatory role and being free of federal regulatory impositions? The 
record from the federalism–administrative law sextet is mixed, but 
offers some basis for optimism.182 A fuller picture emerges from 
taking a step back from these decisions and assessing administrative 
law’s adequacy as a federalism surrogate from a more abstract 
perspective. Reasons exist to be skeptical of the extent to which 
agencies will protect state regulatory prerogatives. As discussed in 
this Section, scholars have identified a number of institutional 
 
 182. Oregon is clearest in cautioning agencies that they must give due heed to the regulatory 
role played by states in federal statutes. Massachusetts, in turn, grants states an important role in 
challenging federal policy. Moreover, although the Court ruled against the state or against state 
authority in the other four decisions, those decisions also preserve some openings for state 
regulation. ADEC, for example, emphasized the broad discretion states exercises over granting 
permits, see Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 490 (2004) 
(emphasizing the “considerable leeway” to be accorded to the “permitting authority”), whereas 
technically Watters precluded only state enforcement and oversight efforts, leaving the states 
free “to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly 
interfere with the national bank’s or national bank regulator’s exercise of its powers,” Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1567 (2007). More to the point, the fact that the Court 
ultimately ruled against the states in these decisions does not mean that the administrative law 
approach failed to ensure that states’ interests received sufficient consideration. Nor should the 
agencies’ evident lack of sympathy for state concerns in these decisions be taken as grounds for 
condemning the administrative law approach as inadequate; not only does that mistakenly 
conflate agencies and administrative law, but it also ignores the way that the Court’s 
development of the administrative law approach might affect agencies’ attitudes in the future. 
This is not to deny that deficiencies existed in the Court’s analysis in these decisions, or that the 
administrative law approach would need to be strengthened to have meaningful future effect. 
See infra Part IV. 
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features and failings of federal administrative agencies that may 
undermine their sensitivity to state interests, such as agencies’ lack of 
direct political accountability, their potential proclivity to tunnel 
vision and capture by industry, and their lack of expertise on matters 
of constitutional structure or values. Yet it is also easy to 
underestimate the influence that the states can wield administratively 
and the extent to which debates about the appropriate balance of 
federal-state regulatory authority turn on questions that agencies are 
particularly well qualified to answer. 
Critically, moreover, administrative agencies and administrative 
law are not the same thing. Administrative law involves deference to 
agency decisionmaking, to be sure, but it encompasses significantly 
more than that, including procedural limits on agencies and 
independent judicial scrutiny in some contexts. As a result, 
administrative law represents an important mechanism for improving 
federal agencies’ responsiveness to state regulatory interests. More 
generally, administrative law’s capaciousness and nonconstitutional, 
generic character can yield important benefits for the advancement of 
federalism. 
1. Political Accountability and State Influence on Federal 
Agencies.  Skeptics of administrative preemption have identified 
several reasons to doubt the extent to which agencies can adequately 
protect a regulatory role for the states. First among these is the 
claimed lack of political safeguards for federalism in the 
administrative context. As Justice Stevens put it, “[u]nlike Congress, 
administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the 
interests of States.”183 Moreover, although presidential oversight may 
render agencies politically accountable to some degree, that fact does 
not necessarily tie agencies to state interests. Quite to the contrary, 
the president is often identified as representing national interests 
 
 183. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 805, 832 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 103, at 331; Damien J. Marshall, Note, The 
Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 277–78 
(1998). For contrary views, see Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 758–60; 
Richard J. Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power 
to Preempt State Regulations, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 664 (1985). 
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against the more parochial views of members of Congress.184 That 
nationalist focus may make agencies more inclined to value 
regulatory uniformity over state variation and more likely to heed the 
cries of national industrial groups bemoaning the burdens of state 
regulation.185 The hierarchical aspect of agencies also plays a role here 
as it may serve to restrict states’ access to federal decisionmakers, 
particularly compared to the multiple points of entry the states enjoy 
in Congress.186 
Concerns about the states’ loss of influence in the executive 
branch have some merit. But it is also easy to exaggerate the extent of 
this loss. Numerous factors, such as congressional oversight, federal 
officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political 
organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve 
to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency 
decisionmaking.187 The influence states wield by virtue of their role in 
federal regulatory programs merits particular note. Studies of joint 
federal-state regulatory programs indicate that the extent of state 
power in these contexts has varied over the years, reflecting changes 
in political climate, regulatory approaches, and perceptions of state 
regulatory competence.188 These studies also document a trend toward 
 
 184. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985). But see Jede Nzebile, The Fable of the Nationalist 
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1217–23 (2006). 
 185. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 362–68 (1986) (describing 
agency arguments of the need for uniformity); see also Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1590–99. 
 186. On the importance of such multiple power bases in Congress, see generally Carol F. 
Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court 
Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988). For a more skeptical view of 
states’ access to Congress, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1979–81. 
 187. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1965–68; Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back into Political Safeguards, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278–86 (2000); Mendelson, Chevron 
and Preemption, supra note 175, at 768–69. 
 188. See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD 
WASHINGTON 129–70 (1995) (providing an overview of changes in federal-state relations from 
1960 through the early 1990s); Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The 
Collision Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUBLIUS 413, 
415–18, 420–22 (2007) (detailing the changed federal-state relationships in the environmental 
arena under the Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations); Denise Scheberle, The Evolving 
Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 69, 75, 
77–84 (2005) (describing the changed managerial approaches in federal environmental programs 
that delegated greater managerial control to implementing states); Michael J. Scicchitano & 
David M. Hedge, From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, 
and OSH Act, PUBLIUS, Fall 1993, at 107, 109 (noting that the initial implementation of several 
federal environmental and health statutes was largely coercive toward the states but changed by 
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more coercive federal-state relationships since the 1960s, with states 
increasingly facing mandates and federal preemption.189 Nonetheless, 
responsibility for program implementation and enforcement appears 
to enhance state influence over federal agency decisionmaking.190 
Agency structure also appears relevant, with regional offices offering 
an opportunity for developing closer state-federal relationships and 
sensitivity to state interests.191 Such close relationships may create 
internal agency support for paying attention to state needs that could 
counterbalance the states’ loss of external access to federal 
decisionmakers as a result of the shift of policy setting to the agency 
context and away from Congress.192 
 
the mid- to late 1990s, with the federal and state governments coming to share responsibility 
over implementation). 
 189. See John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS OF THE AM. 
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148–49 (1990); Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism 
in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS 390, 390–92, 400 (2007). But see Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to 
Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 663, 666–68 (2006) (arguing that the current 
federal-state system is more opportunistic than coercive or cooperative because “actors . . . 
pursue their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective 
consequences”); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush 
Administration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 446–47 (2007) (arguing that federal-state relationships 
demonstrate a continuous metamorphosis and are more complex and nuanced than descriptions 
such as “coercive” or “cooperative” convey). 
 190. See Robert Agranoff, Managing Within the Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental 
Relations Exist?, PUBLIUS, Fall 2001, at 31, 45–54; Scheberle, supra note 188, at 75–77; 
Scicchitano & Hedge, supra note 188, at 114–15; Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, 
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1738–
41 (2001) (describing the influence and role of states under the 1996 Telecom Act). 
 191. DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE 
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 159–80, 182–83, 188 (1997). 
 192. State and federal regulators’ shared policy goals and professional expertise may also 
work to defend a state regulatory role, but the impact of these ties is more contentious. In 
particular, Professor Roderick Hills has argued that substantive policy ties between state and 
federal administrators may mean that state administrators will put substantive federal policy 
goals with which they agree above state institutional interests in preserving an independent state 
regulatory role. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic 
Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1236–37 (2001). But the same should hold true of federal 
administrative officials: when state regulation may offer substantive policy benefits, federal 
officials should seek to protect state regulatory authority. In this vein, Professor Nina 
Mendelson has argued that federal agency officials may be particularly likely to appreciate the 
national benefits that can accrue from state regulatory autonomy, for example in the way that 
one state’s experimentation can yield new regulatory solutions which other states and the 
national government can then pursue. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, 
at 767–68; see also Scheberle, supra note 188, at 73–75. In the end, it seems likely that whether 
substantive and personal ties between federal and state administrative officials serve to protect 
state regularly authority or instead undermine it will vary according to the specific program and 
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2. Potential Pitfalls of Federal Agencies: Aggrandizement, 
Tunnel Vision, Capture, and Lack of Expertise.  Public choice and 
institutional competency arguments are also raised against federal 
agencies’ ability to serve as reliable representatives for state 
regulatory interests. One such argument asserts that agencies are 
primarily interested in expanding their own policymaking power and 
achieving their programmatic goals, which sets them in conflict with 
state regulatory autonomy. Another contends that agencies are overly 
responsive to particular industry or other constituencies and will 
privilege those constituencies’ interests over state claims to regulatory 
authority.193 A third maintains that federal agencies’ specific 
programmatic focus makes them ill equipped to consider general 
issues of the appropriate federal-state balance.194 Relatedly, some 
scholars contend that agencies lack expertise on such questions of 
constitutional values and general government structure.195 
Again, these arguments have some intuitive attraction. It is hard 
to dispute the risk that federal agencies will privilege their specific 
programmatic goals over more general concerns relating to 
government structure, or may be unduly beholden to particular 
regulated entities. After all, administrative tunnel vision and agency 
capture are hardly unknown phenomena.196 It is similarly plausible 
 
issue involved. This is not to deny, as a number of commentators have argued, that “close 
cooperation among experts at the state and federal level . . . undermines the power of elected 
officials at both levels,” Kramer, supra note 187, at 283 n.269, but rather to question whether 
policy and professional ties necessarily work to the benefit of federal bureaucrats over state 
bureaucrats. 
 193. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the 
Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 951, 951–53 (2005) (describing the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
interested in “maximizing its own power and prestige” and as captured by “investment bankers 
and their lawyers”); Wilmarth, supra note 84, at 295–97 (arguing that the OCC’s preemption of 
state oversight and regulation resulted from the agency’s desire to expand its jurisdiction and 
obtain benefits for national banks, its core constituency). 
 194. See Marshall, supra note 183, at 279–81; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra 
note 175, at 793–97; Merrill, supra note 175, at 755–56. 
 195. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 779–91; Merrill, supra note 
175, at 755; see also Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 793–94 (arguing 
that allowing agencies to consider general federalism concerns untethered to a particular 
statutory scheme raises a danger of unconstrained and thus potentially arbitrary agency 
decisionmaking). 
 196. See, e.g., Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 781; Merrill, supra 
note 175, at 727. But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
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that at least in some contexts federal agencies view state regulators as 
competitors and seek to use preemption to advance their institutional 
interests.197 The spate of aggressive preemption efforts by numerous 
different agencies during the Bush administration—the OCC, FDA, 
Consumer Product Safety Administration, the National Highway 
Safety Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration—
raises real concerns about the potential for federal bureaucratic 
empire building at the expense of the states.198 
Yet public choice accounts of agency motivation become unduly 
simplistic, to the extent that they portray federal agency officials as 
motivated solely by desire for greater resources and power without 
consideration of what represents the best regulatory policy.199 It also is 
mistaken to think that agency self-interest always lies on the side of 
expanding federal regulatory power at state expense. Even in public 
choice terms that account rings hollow, as the potential for 
congressional retaliation or the desire to avoid new responsibilities 
may lead rational agency officials to a different account of where their 
parochial interests lie.200 The view that agencies will advance the 
interests of favored regulatory constituencies at the expense of the 
states is similarly oversimplified.201 Too many instances exist of 
 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 130–32 (2005) 
(arguing that fears of agency capture are often exaggerated). 
 197. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 84, at 276–77 (providing evidence supporting the claim 
that recent OCC preemption efforts were affected by the OCC’s desire to expand the number of 
banks with national bank charters and thereby expand the fees the OCC collects). 
 198. For a description of these proposals, see Sharkey, supra note 3, at 230–42. For a 
discussion of bureaucratic empire building more generally, see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-
Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 942 (2005). 
 199. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 26–31 
(2000); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 
GEO. L.J. 97, 121–23 (2000); Stephenson, supra note 196, at 129–35. 
 200. Levinson, supra note 198, at 923–37; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 
175, at 796; Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that 
Delimit the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 982 (1994). 
 201. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spitzer Legacy and the Cuomo Future, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 
20, 2008, at 5 (arguing that regulatory capture accounts of the SEC fail to adequately describe 
the agency); see also Stephenson, supra note 196, at 131 (stating that “recent research suggests 
that the ‘agency capture’ problem has been wildly overstated” and that “[t]he risk of capture is 
also less acute when an agency has a broad jurisdiction, as such agencies respond to (and draw 
their personnel from) multiple constituencies with competing interests”). At a minimum, 
whether agency capture works to the detriment of state regulatory interests seems likely to turn 
on the extent to which states are an important constituency of the agency. See supra note 190 
and accompanying text; see also Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1565–66. 
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federal agencies refusing to preempt or seeking to expand state 
regulatory autonomy to conclude that federal agencies are 
categorically insensitive or hostile to preserving a state regulatory 
role.202 This is not to deny that federal agencies are able to aggrandize 
themselves at the expense of the states when so inclined. But the fact 
that federal agencies frequently are not so inclined merits emphasis, 
and underscores that the explanation for federal agency behavior is 
more complicated. 
One crucial variable the public choice account omits is politics. 
An agency’s political agenda is likely to affect whether the agency will 
seek to accord states a regulatory role or instead centralize control in 
Washington. Thus, recent efforts to preempt state tort actions are in 
line with the Bush administration’s support for tort reform and 
restrictions.203 At least some of these preemption efforts were rejected 
under prior presidential administrations with different political 
agendas.204 Indeed, politics rather than institutional position often 
 
 202. See Gersen, supra note 34, at 235; Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in 
the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Account, 2006 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 73 
(noting that during the Rehnquist Court, the solicitor general only took “a pro-preemption 
position in 39 of 95 preemption cases, or about 40 percent”); Sharkey, supra note 176, at 475–76. 
 203. Opponents of these regulatory measures see them in terms of the administration’s 
general support for limits on tort actions. See, e.g., William Funk et al., The Truth About Torts; 
Using Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM PUBLICATION, Sept. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
Truth_Torts_704.pdf (“In recent years, the Bush administration has launched an unprecedented 
aggressive campaign to persuade the courts to preempt state tort actions.”); Stephen Labaton, 
‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5. The White 
House, not surprisingly, denies the charge that these preemption proposals “reflect a concerted 
administrative policy.” Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 
2006, at D1. It is worth noting that some of the regulations involve agencies headed by 
independent commissions rather than simply agencies led by presidential political appointees, 
complicating the claim that they represent a Bush administration initiative. On the other hand, 
the use of preemption appeared to grow significantly since 2006, a time by which President Bush 
would have been able to significantly affect the membership of most independent agencies, and 
independent agencies are often quite responsive to presidential policy preferences. See 
Bressman, supra note 132, at 1807–08 (describing presidential influence over independent 
agencies). 
 204. See OCC, Investment Securities; Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate 
Activities; Bank Activities and Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,092, 60,095 (Nov. 4, 1999) (refusing 
to state in rulemaking under the Clinton administration that the OCC’s supervisory jurisdiction 
over national bank operating subsidiaries is exclusive, a position the OCC subsequently adopted 
under the Bush administration, see OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 60 Fed. Reg. 1,895, 
1,900–01 (2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34(e)(3), 7.4006 (2008))); David A. Kessler & David 
C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 
GEO. L.J. 461, 463 (2008) (emphasizing that the FDA’s current view that state failure-to-warn 
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seems to be the driving force behind federal administrative 
limitations on (or deference to) the states. In that regard, agencies 
appear little different from Congress or even the courts.205 
As that suggests, the real issue here is one of comparative 
institutional competency. Which institution—Congress, federal 
agencies, or the courts—is best situated to make the relevant political 
choices? Which will give greatest weight to preserving a meaningful 
state regulatory role?206 Constitutionally, Congress is the federal 
institution with primary policy-setting responsibility, and Congress is 
also the institution most structured to represent state interests.207 Yet 
it is not clear that Congress offers significantly more sensitivity to 
 
cases involving drugs are preempted represents “a seismic shift in FDA policy”); see also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1449–50 (2007) (noting that the EPA’s general counsels 
in 1998 and 1999, during the Clinton administration, had taken the view that the EPA had 
authority to regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA, a view the agency subsequently rejected in 
2003 under the Bush administration); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913–14 (2006) (noting 
that President Clinton’s attorney general, Janet Reno, in response to a request for enforcement 
made by (among others) then-Senator John Ashcroft, had concluded that the Department of 
Justice lacked authority to determine that assisted suicide did not constitute legitimate medical 
practice—a view that Ashcroft later reversed when he became attorney general under President 
Bush). But see Coffee, supra note 201 (expressing skepticism that politics alone determines the 
level of SEC enforcement). 
The Bush administration’s greater responsiveness to these preemption proposals 
compared to the Clinton administration underscores that traditional identifications of 
Republicans as favoring state rights and Democrats as advocating national power are becoming 
outdated. See generally Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the 
Transformation of American Conservativism, 37 PUBLIUS 279 (2007) (identifying the Bush 
administration as supportive of centralization over federalism and tying this to ascendancy of 
social and economic conservativism domestically and neoconservatism in foreign affairs). 
 205. On politics dominating over federalism principles in Congress, see Conlan, supra note 
189, at 667, 671; Hills, supra note 108, at 36. On politics dominating over federalism principles in 
courts, see Richard Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 432, 469 (2001). Additionally, one study found “a significant 
ideological component” in judicial federalism decisions, although it also noted that “honest 
federalism” could be playing a strong role. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three 
Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 741, 768 (2000). 
 206. Scholarship on administrative preemption has emphasized the centrality of this point 
concerning comparative institutional competency. See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, 
at 1948–84; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 779–94; Merrill, supra note 
175, at 753–58. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the need to 
assess institutional competence in comparative perspective). 
 207. See Merrill, supra note 175, at 753; see also Clark, supra note 5, at 1331. 
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state regulatory prerogatives than federal agencies do.208 In any event, 
insisting that Congress itself resolve all federal-state questions is a 
nonstarter. Congress simply lacks the resources and foresight to 
resolve all the federalism issues that can arise in a given regulatory 
scheme. Requiring Congress to do so would impose a significant 
obstacle to federal regulation, something the Court’s delegation cases 
indicate it is not prepared to do.209 
As a result, in many ways the critical comparison is between 
federal agencies and federal courts; given that Congress will delegate 
broadly, one of the other institutions will need to resolve the 
federalism disputes that inevitably will arise.210 Moreover, it is hard to 
contest that of these two, agencies are more competent to make overt 
political choices.211 Yet a case nonetheless could be made that the 
courts have a comparative advantage over agencies in resolving 
federalism questions. Unlike specialized, program-focused agencies, 
 
 208. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 768, 759–69 (arguing that 
Congress’s regional structure gives it “no special advantage in considering . . . more ‘national’ 
federalism benefits” and that “it is unclear why members of Congress would have any special 
incentive (beyond their incentive to respond to officials of their particular state) to respond to 
the . . . views” of state organizations like the National Governors’ Association); see also Note, 
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1605 (2007) 
(noting that “Congress almost never responds to the Court’s preemption decisions”); supra text 
accompanying notes 187–92 (describing state influence over agencies). 
 209. The fact that in none of the federalism–administrative law sextet of decisions did the 
Court expressly rely on devices such as clear statement rules or the presumption against 
preemption reinforces this point, as these devices might be thought of as means to ensure that 
Congress itself resolve federalism disputes. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 619–29, 
631 (describing clear statement rule devices); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 
175, at 759 (arguing that the presumption against preemption could be seen “as a method of 
ensuring that Congress itself makes the preemption decision”); see also supra Part II.B. 
 210. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 251–52. 
 211. Even scholars who advocate treating courts “as the primary institution for resolving 
preemption controversies” agree. Merrill, supra note 175, at 759; see also Bamberger, supra note 
178 (manuscript at 33–34) (arguing that agencies are more aware and sensitive to congressional 
policy preferences than courts); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1981–85 (emphasizing 
agencies’ susceptibility to influence by the political branches). Although administrative law 
scholars dispute the role that presidential political priorities should play in agency 
decisionmaking, the debate is over how much weight to give such priorities, rather than over 
whether politics should have any influence on agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001) (arguing in favor of strong 
presidential oversight); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President 
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 697–705, 738–60 (2007) (emphasizing the 
distinction between presidential guidance and oversight and presidential assertion of primary 
decisional responsibility and arguing against the latter). 
02__METZGER.DOC 9/30/2008  2:05:45 PM 
2082 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:2023 
 
the federal courts are generalist institutions that have special 
responsibilities to enforce constitutional structures and values.212 In 
practice, however, it is not at all clear that the federal courts have 
been more sensitive to state regulatory interests than agencies have 
been, and at times courts have been strong enforcers of federal 
uniformity over state control.213 Indeed, several commentators have 
noted the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to curtail state regulatory 
authority in a variety of contexts.214 
This leaves for consideration the claim that agencies simply lack 
expertise in determining the proper balance between federal and 
state regulation, particularly as compared to courts. Here, much turns 
on how the question of expertise is framed. Agencies have no special 
claim to expertise in assessing the proper federal-state balance in the 
abstract, divorced from a particular regulatory scheme or statute. But 
federalism disputes are unlikely to surface in such a form—whether 
before agencies, the federal courts, or Congress. Instead, as the 
federalism–administrative law sextet suggests, these questions arise in 
particular regulatory contexts. In such contexts, questions about the 
appropriate federal-state balance are not easily separated from 
substantive policy determinations on which agencies do have 
expertise.215 ADEC is illustrative: The strength and legitimacy of the 
 
 212. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 787–88; Merrill, supra note 
175, 757–58. 
 213. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 108, at 1356–57; Weiser, supra note 190, at 1705–
08. 
 214. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action 
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1306–07 (2002); Fallon, supra note 205, at 432, 
469 (noting the lack of a consistent state prerogative thread in Rehnquist Court decisions and 
concluding that the driving force was instead conservatism); Meltzer, supra note 107, at 367–68, 
376; see also Young, supra note 4, at 23–32 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court emphasized 
formal sovereignty over substantive power). 
 215. See Bamberger, supra note 178 (manuscript at 32–33); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 
178, at 1967–68. This seems to me equally true of preemption decisions; all that is needed to 
translate a preemption question into a clear policy choice is consideration of whether state 
regulation is an obstacle to achieving federal regulatory goals. As Professor Catherine Sharkey 
has written, “[w]ith respect to answering the key regulatory policy issue at the heart of the 
preemption query—namely, whether there in fact should be a uniform federal regulatory 
policy—federal agencies emerge as the institutional actor best equipped to provide the answer.” 
Sharkey, supra note 176, at 477; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that agency responsibility for administering a statute “means 
informed agency involvement and, therefore, special understanding of the likely impact of both 
state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to which) 
state requirements may interfere with federal objectives”). But see Merrill, supra note 175, at 
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state dignity concerns asserted there cannot be assessed in isolation 
from the importance of EPA oversight of state BACT determinations 
to achieving the CAA’s goals, a question on which the EPA has the 
relevant expertise. Indeed, framed in terms of particular contexts, 
agencies likely will have greatest expertise on the specific question of 
how best to balance federal-state regulatory roles.216 The difficulty in 
separating substantive policy and federalism also undermines the 
institutional competency arguments in favor of courts, for courts are 
comparatively ill-equipped to assess the substantive impact that 
preserving a state role may have on a particular regulatory regime.217 
3. Administrative Law’s Procedural and Substantive 
Requirements.  The foregoing suggests that claims of agency 
insensitivity to state interests may well be exaggerated. Instead, a real 
possibility exists that agencies might in fact play a federalism-
enforcing role—and even do so comparatively more effectively than 
courts. Equally important is the distinction between agencies and 
administrative law. Administrative law traditionally has served as a 
basic mechanism for policing against agency capture and self-
aggrandizement, as well as against the excessive politicization of 
administrative decisionmaking.218 Thus the issue is not simply whether 
 
749–50 (emphasizing the extent to which preemption determinations involve general 
constitutional questions of the proper balance between federal and state governments). 
 216. While this may be particularly true in regard to cooperative regulatory schemes, which 
by their nature entail substantial interaction between the two levels of government, it is also 
true even when federal and state regulation is largely independent. See Gersen, supra note 34, at 
233; Pierce, supra note 183, at 664; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 485–90 (discussing federal 
expertise on regulatory impact of state tort law). Nor can federal insensitivity to state authority 
be presumed in contexts in which federal and state regulators are rivals. State regulation may in 
fact serve federal interests, for example by allowing federal regulators to redirect their oversight 
activities or save on enforcement costs. Whether federal administrators can benefit from state 
efforts depends on the regulatory policy and goals of federal and state governments being 
similar—but conflicting policies would seem to be a fair (as in jurisdictionally neutral) grounds 
for federal officials to be concerned about state actions. And even when policy conflict exists, 
other factors, such as congressional oversight or political ramifications more generally, may 
ensure that federal agencies accommodate state concerns. 
 217. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1968; Merrill, supra note 175, at 758. 
 218. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 60, 87 (arguing that Massachusetts 
represented an attempt to check “politicization of [agency] expertise” and arguing that this 
expertise-forcing approach “hearkens back to an older, pre-Chevron vision of administrative 
law in which independence and expertise are seen as opposed to, rather than defined by, 
political accountability”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-
1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997) (describing the development of agency 
capture concerns and their influence on the courts in the period 1967–1983); Robert L. Rabin, 
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agencies will be appropriately sensitive to state interests on their own, 
but rather whether administrative law offers adequate protection 
against agency failure to take federalism concerns seriously. 
One central means by which administrative law may do so is in 
the procedural requirements it imposes on agency action, in particular 
the opportunities for state notification and participation created by 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and amplified by 
substantive requirements of agency explanation and reasoned 
decisionmaking.219 From a political perspective, notice-and-comment 
rulemaking offers a means by which states can learn of pending 
agency action that might harm their interests and inform their 
political allies in Congress.220 Especially interesting here is Congress’s 
inclusion in several statutes of notice-and-comment rulemaking or its 
equivalent as a prerequisite before an agency can displace a state 
regulatory role.221 This suggests that, at a minimum, members of 
Congress—or state groups lobbying Congress—consider such 
procedures to offer some protection against encroachments on state 
regulatory authority. From a more legal and agency-functioning 
viewpoint, notice-and-comment rulemaking offers a means of 
ensuring agencies are informed of and respond to state concerns.222 
The relative formality and centralized aspect of notice-and-comment 
 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1300, 1308–09, 1315 (1986) 
(linking the emergence of more searching judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions to 
suspicions about agency good faith and competency). 
 219. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). For similar views, see Bamberger, supra note 178 
(manuscript at 35–36); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2006–11; Mendelson, Chevron and 
Preemption, supra note 175, at 777–78; Merrill, supra note 175, at 755, 764–65. 
 220. Positive political theory views administrative procedure as a means of assisting 
congressional oversight and protecting against bureaucratic drift. See Bressman, supra note 132, 
at 1767–76 (describing positive political theory and noting some criticisms of its account); 
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON & ORG. 243, 259–60 (1987); Matthew D. 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–44 
(1989). 
 221. See supra note 124. 
 222. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1949–55; Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with 
Your Chevron? Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
823, 874 (1995); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 777–78; Merrill, supra 
note 175, 764–65. 
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rulemaking also helps ensure that agency determinations are made 
after considerable deliberation and review.223 
Professor Nina Mendelson has correctly insisted that the ability 
of states to protect their regulatory interests through notice-and-
comment rulemaking is largely an empirical question, as are claims 
about the extent of state influence on federal agency 
decisionmaking.224 Although public administration scholarship offers 
studies of many aspects of federal-state relationships, surprisingly 
little empirical evidence exists on federal-state interactions in 
rulemaking and other procedural contexts of particular relevance to 
administrative law.225 Studies do exist documenting federal agencies’ 
failure to take seriously the federalism assessment obligations 
imposed by Executive Order 13,132, which suggests that notice-and-
comment rulemaking may not actually yield significant federalism 
benefits.226 On the other hand, the executive order expressly states 
that it is “not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law,”227 which makes it a poor basis on 
which to draw conclusions about the federalism impact of judicially 
enforceable requirements.228 
 
 223. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541–42 (2003); Nagareda, supra note 178, at 45–46. 
 224. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 758–59. 
 225. See id. Moreover, useful quantifiable data may be hard to produce, given that some 
quantifiable measures, such as agency responses to state comments in the preambles of final 
rules, id. at 776 n.164, may be prone to agency manipulation. As a result, detailed case studies of 
states’ influence on particular regulatory initiatives might prove the most profitable. 
 226. See L. NYE STEVENS, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (1999), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99093t.pdf (reporting that only five federalism 
impact statements were prepared in conjunction with issuance of 11,000 final rules between 
April 1996 and December 1998); Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 175, at 783–
85 (sampling 600 proposed or final rulemakings in a three-month period and finding that only 
six federalism impact statements had been prepared by agencies, with none of these 
acknowledging the “value of preserving state regulatory prerogatives”); Mendelson, A 
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 695 (sampling 485 proposed and 
final rulemakings in a three-month period and finding only three in which the agency concluded 
that a federalism impact assessment was required); see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 
206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring impact statements). 
 227. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 11, 3 C.F.R. at 211. Whether such an order could create 
enforceable rights need not be considered here. 
 228. Anecdotal evidence also exists of notice-and-comment requirements having a state-
protective impact. For example, the Department of Homeland Security retracted its initial 
broad preemption position regarding the security at chemical plants after receiving a number of 
critical comments. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2014–15. 
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Hence, perhaps the fairest conclusion is that the jury is still out 
with respect to whether notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures 
in practice yield significant federalism-enforcing benefits. 
Nonetheless, this potential exists at least in theory and could be 
reinforced by other means, such as the substantive requirements 
administrative law imposes on agency decisionmaking. Agencies must 
respond to significant comments not simply to fulfill the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural demands, but also 
to avoid having courts find their determinations arbitrary and 
capricious. The effect is to create significant obligations of 
explanation for agencies.229 Express invocation of state interests is also 
relatively easily included within an administrative law framework, as 
a presumptively relevant factor that agencies must consider in their 
decisionmaking. The states’ constitutional significance alone seems 
sufficient ground on which to require that agencies consider and 
justify the impact of a proposed regulation on the states’ regulatory 
role, at least absent indication that Congress intended agencies to 
ignore this factor.230 But at a minimum, statutory provision for a state 
regulatory role—for instance, in cooperative regulatory schemes or 
savings clauses limiting preemption—provides a firm basis for 
requiring that agencies take seriously the impact a proposed 
regulation will have on the states. Finally, these procedural and 
substantive requirements may create incentives for an agency to 
consult with states early on, before the agency has promulgated a 
proposed rule and at a time when it may be most receptive to 
alternatives.231 
4. The Capaciousness of Administrative Law.  A second 
important advantage of administrative law is its institutional and 
doctrinal capaciousness. Administrative law is institutionally 
capacious because it includes rules that govern the actions of multiple 
institutions—controlling not only internal agency actions, but also 
external review of agency actions by courts. Indeed, administrative 
law in some ways even encompasses Congress, as it addresses 
 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 132–37. 
 230. See infra text accompanying notes 257–59. As noted above, agencies are required to 
assess and justify impact on the states under Executive Order No. 13,132, see supra note 126, but 
the Executive Order is not itself judicially enforceable, Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 11, 3 C.F.R. at 
211. 
 231. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2011. 
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Congress’s constitutional ability to design agencies and control their 
decisionmaking and also contains elaborate doctrines of statutory 
interpretation. Administrative law is also doctrinally capacious, and in 
particular includes prescriptions for both deference and searching 
scrutiny. Courts need not step outside existing doctrinal frameworks 
to rein in agencies perceived to be overreaching or insufficiently 
sensitive to significant state interests. 
This institutional and doctrinal breadth allows administrative law 
to draw on the federalism-reinforcing aspects of both agencies and 
courts. For example, by independently scrutinizing the scope of 
power Congress has delegated to an agency, courts can guard against 
agency overreaching at the expense of the states. Substantive scrutiny 
of agency reasoning can flush out instances of agency capture and 
other failures in agency functioning. Yet requiring that courts defer to 
well-reasoned administrative determinations within this range of 
delegated authority also allows room for agencies to exercise some 
discretion on federalism matters. Moreover, by forcing an agency to 
provide notice of actions it plans to take, procedural requirements 
empower congressional oversight and thus reinforce such political 
safeguards as Congress has to offer. 
Extolling administrative law’s doctrinal capaciousness as a 
federalism virtue is more than a little ironic. It is precisely this 
feature—the fact that administrative law offers judges a number of 
doctrinal options—that many administrative law scholars identify as 
its fundamental flaw. Their complaint is that this breadth translates 
into essentially unconstrained power in reviewing courts.232 That 
complaint is very relevant here, because it suggests that in practice 
 
 232. These complaints are raised, for example, in commentary on Chevron and ossification 
of rulemaking. The former tends to stress the danger that judges will impose their own preferred 
policies in lieu of the agencies’, thereby undermining political accountability and principled 
decisionmaking. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208–11 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Essay, 
Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1304–05, 1308–10 (1999); see also Merrill, 
supra note 142, at 819–21 (arguing for a clearer rule-based approach to determining when 
Chevron applies); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 825–27. The latter tends to focus on the 
harmful effects potentially broad-ranging judicial review has on agency functioning, such as 
requiring agencies to devote substantially greater resources to rulemaking or forego it 
altogether, as well as on how judges’ lack of substantive knowledge and expertise undermines 
their ability to review agency action intelligently. See Cross, supra, at 1332; Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387–
96, 1400–03 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–62 (1995). 
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administrative law is not that institutionally capacious at all; in the 
end, the courts call the shots across the board. Some might contest the 
claim that administrative law is capacious even if courts do succeed 
(at least sometimes) in combining independent scrutiny with 
deferential review. The problem is that on any given issue one 
institution—court or agency—will dominate. 
Despite these objections, administrative law’s breadth still offers 
a potential federalism payoff. Much scholarship has identified the 
ways that judicial review—for better or worse—indirectly influences 
how agencies operate,233 and even if Chevron is only softly 
constraining, it nonetheless may lead judges to defer to agency policy 
choices in some contexts.234 Limited impacts such as these suffice to 
conclude that some potential exists to harness the federalism-
reinforcing aspects of both courts and agencies through 
administrative law. 
In any event, judicial ability to manipulate administrative law 
doctrine seems unlikely to work significantly against the regulatory 
interests of the states. Consider in this regard the Court’s decision in 
Watters. Chevron’s malleability, specifically the potential 
expansiveness of the step one inquiry, is prominently on display. But 
it is harder to imagine the Court reading the NBA so expansively had 
the OCC concluded preemption was inappropriate. Indeed, in none 
of the six decisions did the Court use its independent judgment to 
undermine state regulatory interests in the face of state-protective 
 
 233. For arguments that judicial review improves agency decisionmaking, see William F. 
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59–60 (1975); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490–91, 522–26, 543–47 (2001). For arguments that judicial review is 
harmful, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
224–28 (1990); Pierce, supra note 232, at 65–66, and see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION 
AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 294–98 (1983). 
 234. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 856–58 (noting that although judges often vote 
with their political preferences, panels including at least one judge nominated by a Republican 
president and one judge nominated by a Democratic president exhibit a tendency to vote less 
along party lines in Chevron cases); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 911 n.71  (2008) 
(summarizing scholarship on Chevron’s effect and noting studies “suggest[ing] that courts 
overwhelmingly defer to agency action”); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, Studying 
Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 519, 533 (1990) (reporting early evidence of Chevron’s effect and concluding that courts 
were more likely to affirm agency decisions after Chevron); see also Pauline T. Kim, Lower 
Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (2007) (emphasizing the limits of purely 
political accounts of judicial behavior). 
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agency action. Empirical studies of preemption offer further support. 
Notably, the federal government’s opposition significantly reduces 
the likelihood that the Court will find preemption.235 
Put somewhat differently, if assertions of the federal courts’ 
greater institutional competency and sensitivity on federalism matters 
are true, then the courts’ ability to manipulate deference doctrines 
should operate in federalism’s favor. The real danger is that these 
assertions may not be true and that, on the contrary, states’ interests 
would be best advanced by more thoroughgoing judicial deference to 
agency decisionmaking. If so, however, that would merely underscore 
the importance of the administrative component of administrative 
law, rather than call the possibility of administrative law serving as a 
federalism surrogate into question. 
5. The Normalizing Function of Administrative Law.  A final 
advantage of administrative law as a means for advancing federalism 
concerns is administrative law’s nonconstitutional and generic 
character. Many administrative law doctrines reflect constitutional 
values and concerns, such as fears of unchecked and irrational 
exercises of coercive power.236 Nonetheless, these doctrines are rarely 
understood to be constitutionally mandated, but instead are viewed as 
largely subject to alteration by Congress.237 Administrative law is also 
generic, in that (absent congressional specification to the contrary) it 
applies to all federal agency actions, not simply those actions that 
raise federalism concerns. 
As suggested in Part II.A, both of these traits may well make 
courts more willing to enforce federalism values through an 
administrative law lens than through a more overtly constitutional or 
 
 235. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Empirical Account, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57, 73–74 (2006) (noting that 
the probability of “an anti-preemption outcome is highly likely . . . when the [solicitor general] 
argues against preemption,” although “preemption litigation in the Supreme Court [was] by and 
large a fifty-fifty proposition” during the period); see also Sharkey, supra note 176, at 455 
(“[T]he influence of the relevant federal agency’s position may be a better predictor of 
outcome.”); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal 
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1177–78 (1999) 
(noting that although federal agencies rarely took a position on preemption challenges before 
the federal appeals courts, “[w]hen they did . . . they appear to have swayed the courts”). 
 236. See Bressman, supra note 223, at 497–503. 
 237. See id. at 462–63, 494–95. 
02__METZGER.DOC 9/30/2008  2:05:45 PM 
2090 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:2023 
 
federalism-driven analysis.238 To begin with, raising federalism 
concerns through the administrative law rubric does not erect a 
permanent barrier to federal administrative action; instead, at most it 
triggers a requirement of additional congressional enactment. More 
significantly, judicial rejection of an agency decision often does not 
serve to take decisional authority away from the agency at all, but 
rather results in a remand for further administrative consideration. 
The generic nature of ordinary administrative law may reinforce 
judicial willingness to scrutinize federal actions that burden the states 
because it allows courts to bypass questions about the legitimacy of 
limiting federal regulation on federalism grounds. Instead, like the 
Oregon majority, courts can claim to be motivated by “familiar 
principles” that are not tied to the subject of federal-state relations.239 
This nonconstitutional and generic character makes 
administrative law also particularly well suited for addressing the 
central challenge of contemporary federalism: ensuring the continued 
relevance of states as regulatory entities in contexts marked by 
concurrent federal-state authority and an extensive national 
administrative state. As argued in Part II.A, under current 
constitutional doctrines, little private activity falls outside the federal 
government’s regulatory power and what does is reachable through 
federal conditional spending.240 Thus, if federalism is to succeed in 
preserving a regulatory role for the states, it has to come into play in 
contexts of concurrent authority.241 In such contexts, however, direct 
constitutional challenges are unlikely to do much work other than at 
the margins.242 Combine all this with judicial unwillingness to impede 
Congress’s ability to delegate responsibility for policy setting to 
 
 238. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 239. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914 (2006). 
 240. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 241. For similar views that ensuring federalism’s relevance in instances of concurrent 
authority is critical, see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 795, 796–99 (1996); Hills, supra note 108, at 4; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of 
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248, 287 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 41, 106–07. 
 242. The anticommandeering rule is an example. Although this rule prohibits the federal 
government from forcing state officials to implement federal programs, see Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), its practical effect is more limited given the ability of the federal 
government to make such state implementation a condition of funding, see South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 813, 871–75 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the anticommandeering 
rule and spending doctrine). 
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administrative agencies, and it seems that federalism will play a quite 
limited role if kept to the form of a constitutional or subconstitutional 
trump on federal action. 
Instead, for federalism to have continued vibrancy as a governing 
principle, it needs to be “normalized” and consciously incorporated 
into the day-to-day functioning of the federal administrative state. 
Using administrative law to ensure that federalism concerns are met 
represents a central mechanism for achieving this incorporation. If 
successful, federalism becomes an everyday consideration, one that 
agencies must take seriously and accommodate yet also one they have 
authority to override provided they adequately justify the need to do 
so. Federalism loses trumping status, but gains everyday relevancy. 
Given federalism’s limited trumping success, this trade-off seems 
worthwhile. 
B. The Legitimacy of Administrative Law’s Use as a Federalism 
Vehicle 
Administrative law thus holds significant federalism-enforcing 
potential, offering a mechanism for ensuring that agencies seriously 
consider state regulatory interests. But that administrative law may 
prove to be a particularly effective vehicle for addressing federalism 
concerns does not mean that using administrative law in this fashion 
is a legitimate judicial undertaking. In particular, the administrative 
approach is open to criticism as an unjustified intrusion on 
congressional power, given that the Court is unwilling to curb 
Congress’s regulatory authority on constitutional grounds. Arguably, 
if Congress acts within its constitutional powers in regulating an area 
and in delegating responsibility to administrative agencies to 
implement its regulatory scheme, then courts lack a basis for 
imposing additional federalism-inspired restrictions on subsequent 
agency determinations.243 Several critics have raised similar legitimacy 
concerns regarding the presumption against preemption,244 clear 
 
 243. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 633–36 (describing the argument against 
enforcing federalism indirectly through clear statement rules). The classic statement of this line 
of argument, raised in conjunction with the constitutional avoidance canon, is in RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 285 (1985). 
 244. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 108, at 2097–100; Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs 
Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 182–87; Nelson, supra note 108, at 290–303. Of course, the 
presumption against preemption also has its defenders. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 241, at 
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statement rules,245 and other process requirements imposed on 
Congress in the name of federalism.246 Albeit analytically distinct in 
important ways, given its primary focus on agency action, the 
administrative law approach is similarly cognizable as a species of 
subconstitutionalism: it represents an effort to promote constitutional 
federalism values through means other than direct imposition of 
constitutional prohibitions. 
This legitimacy complaint has little force if the administrative law 
approach only involves the Court employing ordinary administrative 
law in a manner that redounds to the states’ benefit. In such a case, 
invocation of federalism is not necessary to justify the results the 
Court reaches,247 and the basis for the Court’s actions is the same as 
that which underlies its review of administrative action generally.248 
Even express invocation of federalism, if kept within the established 
parameters of ordinary administrative law, seems unproblematic. To 
 
798–99; Young, supra note 105, at 1385–86; see also Hills, supra note 108, at 17–36 (defending a 
clear statement antipreemption rule). 
 245. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 232, at 1329 (arguing that “process-based clear 
evidence/clear statement” approaches threaten “judicial cooptation of political authority at the 
expense of Congress”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 633–39 (noting the danger that 
clear statement rules represent “backdoor curtailment” of congressional power and 
underscoring the countermajoritarian impact such rules can have in practice). 
 246. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The 
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 328, 369–89 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s imposition of procedural requirements on 
Congress violates separation of powers and ignores how Congress operates); William W. 
Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 90–91 (2001) 
(characterizing the imposition of legislative record requirements on Congress as an “unjustified 
and unworkable judicial arrogation of legislative authority”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 116–23 (2001) (contending that judicially imposed 
legislative record requirements undermine Congress’s status as a coequal branch and curtail 
congressional effectiveness and accountability). Some commentators draw a distinction between 
clear statement requirements, which they support, and legislative record or deliberation 
requirements, which they view as undesirable and inconsistent with how Congress functions. 
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the 
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1740–50 (2002). 
 247. Cf. Manning, supra note 169, at 254 (“[The] canon of constitutional avoidance does no 
work unless used to depart from the most likely or natural meaning of a statute.”). 
 248. Of course, judicial review of administrative action can also be critiqued as lacking basis 
in constitutional or statutory text—and sometimes is. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common 
Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 118 (1998). For examples, see United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 547–48 (1978). But such criticisms are not 
unique to review of administrative action that implicates federalism concerns, and so are 
(largely) outside the scope of this Article. 
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conclude that any express invocation of federalism in review of 
agency action represents judicial usurpation of Congress’s policy-
setting role requires the highly dubious presumption that, unless it 
says otherwise, Congress prefers that agencies not take state interests 
into account at all. 
But the legitimacy critique is also unpersuasive in regard to the 
creation of special administrative law doctrines to protect state 
interests, notwithstanding that here federalism values are used to 
justify imposition of unusual constraints on agency action. To begin 
with, subconstitutionalism is a common feature of the American legal 
landscape. Numerous clear statement requirements and 
constitutionally derived statutory presumptions exist outside the 
federalism area, with the perhaps most prominent example being the 
practice of construing statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional 
concerns.249 That descriptive fact alone may not be a very satisfying 
justification for continuing the practice of advancing constitutional 
values through such subconstitutional means, but it is important to 
recognize what a full-scale rejection of this practice might entail.250 
A number of normative arguments can also be made in 
subconstitutionalism’s defense. It minimizes head-on constitutional 
clashes between the Court and the elected branches and potentially 
offers greater room for constitutional dialogue.251 True, clear 
statement and other process requirements can pose real obstacles for 
Congress, given the difficulty involved in getting new clarifying 
 
 249. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2182 (2005) (invoking 
the canon that statutes will not be read to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly states 
otherwise); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1999) (describing the practice of 
construing statutes to avoid constitutional doubts as “beyond debate”); see also Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 105, at 598–628 (documenting numerous examples arising in the form of 
clear statement rules and presumptions). See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006) (analyzing invocations of 
the avoidance canon within the executive branch). 
 250. The point can be made even stronger: arguably, all statutory interpretation contains 
dimensions of subconstitutionalism, insofar as theories of statutory interpretation are ultimately 
rooted to some extent in constitutional values and concerns. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, 
Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 839 
(1991). I thank Professor Trevor Morrison for this point. 
 251. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, 
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 399, 452–54 (2005). 
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legislation enacted.252 Even so, this impact is less restrictive than direct 
judicial invalidation of a measure on constitutional grounds because 
Congress at least retains the option of reenactment.253 In addition, a 
subconstitutional approach may be better at ensuring that 
constitutional values are given weight in governmental 
decisionmaking, as courts may be more reluctant to enforce such 
values when doing so entails invalidating congressional or executive 
action.254 Indeed, the strength of this last point often fuels the attack 
on subconstitutionalism as an abuse of judicial authority: courts can 
play fast and loose with constitutional review because they do not 
have to resolve constitutional challenges decisively or face the full 
consequences of their constitutional rulings.255 The persuasiveness of 
this critique turns on whether one views underenforcement or 
overenforcement of constitutional norms as the prime danger. But it 
is hard to insist that subconstitutionalism necessarily enlarges judicial 
power beyond proper limits; whether it does so turns a great deal on 
factors such as the degree to which the constitutional concerns 
invoked by courts are well established, the extent of clarity courts 
require from other branches, and judicial transparency and care in 
specifying why constitutional concerns are implicated. 
What all of this suggests is that subconstitutionalism’s legitimacy 
cannot really be established as a general matter; rather, this 
determination rests on the particular constitutional values and 
doctrines at issue.256 The question then becomes assessing the 
legitimacy of the specific practice of devising special administrative 
law doctrines to enforce federalism. This, in turn, implicates two 
separate issues: Should federalism values be judicially enforced 
 
 252. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 638–40; Manning, supra note 169, at 254–55; 
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94–95. 
 253. But see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 105 (1997); Schauer, 
supra note 252, at 94–95. 
 254. Frickey, supra note 251, at 455–59; Sunstein, supra note 103, at 337–400 (defending 
nondelegation canons despite the lack of direct enforcement of constitutional limits on 
delegation); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation 
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1593–99 (2000) (defending subconstitutional doctrines 
as an appropriate means of enforcing constitutional principles that operate more as resistance 
norms than as clear prohibitions on governmental action). 
 255. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 105, at 637; Manning, supra note 169, at 255; 
Schauer, supra note 252, at 87–89; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 
1960–61 (1997). 
 256. Cf. Manning, supra note 169, at 256 (assessing the canon of constitutional avoidance 
specifically as it is used to address nondelegation concerns). 
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through subconstitutional means? And if so, is adapting 
administrative law in this fashion appropriate, or should the Court 
rely on alternative doctrinal mechanisms? 
The first of these, whether federalism merits subconstitutional 
enforcement, has received substantial attention elsewhere. A number 
of scholars have defended a role for the courts in ensuring that 
Congress takes state interests seriously, even when Congress has 
constitutional authority to trump state regulation or impose burdens 
on the states. As a result they have defended judicial imposition of 
process requirements, such as clear statement or deliberation 
demands, on Congress. Rather than being at odds with reliance on 
political safeguards as the central federalism protection, imposition of 
such requirements is portrayed as necessary to ensure that Congress 
is aware of and adequately considers the federalism implications of its 
actions.257 Professor Ernest Young has offered perhaps the most 
elaborate justification for process federalism as a supplement to (if 
not in lieu of) direct constitutional enforcement of enumerated power 
limits. Acknowledging that the Court has little taste for curtailing the 
constitutional scope of congressional power, and that such 
curtailment ill fits the development of a nationally integrated 
economy, Young argues that process federalism represents a justified 
attempt to recreate the federalism principle of balance and division 
between federal and state governments in current realities.258 
Although no constitutional provision imposes such process 
 
 257. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 1323–25, 1425–30; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the 
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 695, 720–22 (1996) (defending process elements of Lopez and arguing for a 
judicial approach in which “the serious federalism problems would be addressed through judge-
created techniques of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation”); Gardbaum, supra 
note 241, at 795, 799–800; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz 
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2240 (1998); Young, supra note 105, at 1358–59. 
 258. See Young, supra note 93, at 31–32; Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: 
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1733, 1762–64, 1775–99, 1836 (2005); Young, supra note 4, at 123–31. Professor Young takes an 
expansive view of what should count as process federalism, including within that category 
“hard” rules that Congress lacks power to remove but that he views as ultimately serving to 
enforce political safeguards of federalism, such as the anticommandeering rule. Young, supra 
note 4, at 127–28. 
02__METZGER.DOC 9/30/2008  2:05:45 PM 
2096 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:2023 
 
requirements, that is true generally of federalism, which manifests as 
a background structural principle more than as a clear textual limit.259 
These arguments demonstrate that, in theory, subconstitutional 
federalism can accord well with our constitutional structure. The 
more serious concern is that, in practice, operation of federalism-
based clarity or deliberation requirements seriously impedes 
Congress’s exercise of its enumerated powers and leads to excessive 
judicial regulation of the functioning of a coequal branch. Here, an 
important point to emphasize is that this concern with illegitimately 
burdening Congress is considerably abated when federalism is 
enforced through administrative law. As the sextet of decisions 
demonstrates, the administrative law framing will often include 
scrutiny of congressional action to determine whether Congress 
authorized or prohibited a challenged agency action that harms state 
interests.260 But such statutory scrutiny occurs within the standard 
frameworks applicable to judicial review of agency-administered 
statutes and thus avoids imposition of additional procedural 
requirements that can create a significant obstacle for Congress to 
overcome. 
More importantly, unlike Congress, federal administrative 
agencies are already required to seek and respond to comments and 
explain their policy choices.261 Judicial scrutiny of agency functioning 
is a constant and everyday aspect of administrative agency existence, 
and courts regularly invalidate agency actions when agency actions 
exceed their authority or when agencies have failed to satisfy 
procedural requirements or to provide an adequate justification for 
their decisions. To be sure, such invalidations can create significant 
obstacles for agencies, and attacks on judicial review for ossifying 
 
 259. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Behind the words of 
the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”); Young, supra note 258, at 
1748, 1754. 
 260. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916 (2006) (emphasizing the need to 
determine if Congress had delegated power to the attorney general to issue the interpretive rule 
in question). 
 261. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49 
(1983); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 
2699–700 (2005) (stating that an agency can change its regulatory approach provided it explains 
why). Indeed, the Court’s decisions imposing process-based limits on Congress are often 
attacked on the grounds that Congress is not an administrative agency. See Bryant & Simeone, 
supra note 246, at 337, 370; Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 246, at 90–91, 97, 120; see also Cross, 
supra note 232, at 1331–32. 
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agency rulemaking are a well-worn component of the administrative 
law oeuvre.262 But the burdens of notice-and-comment rulemaking are 
in practice considerably less onerous than bicameralism and 
presentment.263 In any event, federalism-inspired requirements seem 
unlikely to add significantly to the burdens that agencies already face 
in the rulemaking context. And agencies may be better able to 
overcome any burdens and costs imposed from such requirements 
than Congress is.264 
In their response to this Article, Professors Stuart Benjamin and 
Ernest Young contend to the contrary that this agency focus renders 
the administrative law approach profoundly illegitimate because the 
Constitution requires that choices about the federal-state balance be 
“meaningfully traceable to Congress.”265 Much depends on the degree 
of clarity that “meaningful traceability” requires. No one disputes 
that “an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the 
validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until 
 
 262. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 232, at 1331–32 (“APA review has been quite destructive of 
the regulatory process.”); McGarity, supra note 232, at 1419 (“The predictable result of 
stringent ‘hard look’ judicial review of complex rulemaking is ossification.”). But see William 
Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with 
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
393, 442 (2000) (“[T]he hard look doctrine has not caused a crisis of agency inability to achieve 
regulatory goals through informal rulemaking.”); O’Connell, supra note 234, at 964 (stating that 
new “empirical findings suggest that the administrative state is not greatly ossified”). 
 263. See Young, supra note 4, at 69; see also Merrill, supra note 175, at 750 (noting that 
agencies face lesser procedural obstacles to acting in the context of concluding that, compared 
to Congress and the courts, “[a]gencies are the fast track to preemption”). Indeed, the extent to 
which judicial review restricts agency rulemaking is a matter of debate. Compare Jordan, supra 
note 262, at 443–44 (arguing that “hard look review” does not “seriously hinder agency 
rulemaking efforts,” but conceding that more research is needed to truly understand the impact 
of judicial review on agency rulemaking), and O’Connell, supra note 234, at 932 (concluding 
from review of data from the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions 
that “the procedural costs to rulemaking (from the agency’s perspective) are not so high as to 
prohibit considerable rulemaking activity by agencies” but also documenting an increase in 
interim rulemaking techniques, which might suggest that traditional notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is costly for agencies), with McGarity, supra note 232, at 1387–96, 1400–03, 1410–26 
(arguing that judicial review (as well as legislative and executive branch impositions) has 
resulted in a significant ossification of rulemaking, with agencies avoiding promulgating new 
rules or revisiting existing rules because of the burdens involved), and Pierce, supra note 232, at 
60–66 (same). 
 264. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985) 
(“[I]t is more difficult for Congress to make its intentions known—for example by amending a 
statute—than it is for an agency to amend its regulations or to otherwise indicate its position.”). 
 265. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative 
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2134 (2008). 
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Congress confers power upon it.”266 Indeed, that principle formed the 
basis for the decision in Oregon, in which the Court invalidated 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s interpretive rule on the grounds that 
Congress had not delegated authority to determine what constitutes 
legitimate medical practice to the attorney general.267 More generally, 
the dominance of questions of statutory interpretation in the 
federalism–administrative law sextet demonstrates that Congress is 
far from absent under the administrative law approach, 
notwithstanding this approach’s primary focus on agencies. Statutory 
scrutiny under Chevron’s step zero and step one—at times, as noted 
in Part II.C, quite searching scrutiny268—ensures that agency 
impositions on the states reflect congressional intent. Thus, 
administrative law enforcement of federalism does not lose the 
political safeguards justification that animates process federalism, but 
instead amplifies the political safeguards available by giving weight to 
states in executive branch policy debates and by rendering the effects 
of agency decisions more transparent and more amenable to 
congressional oversight.269 
What the administrative law approach does not demand is a clear 
statement rule to the effect that Congress must clearly authorize 
burdens that administrative agencies impose on the states. But 
demanding clear or express congressional authorization for specific 
agency actions goes well beyond simply requiring that choices about 
the appropriate federal-state balance be made by—or be 
meaningfully traceable to—Congress. Moreover, any claim that 
federalism-based clear statement doctrines are constitutionally 
mandated, as opposed to simply constitutionally justified, is quite 
 
 266. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2097, 2109 (2004) (“[I]t is hornbook law among administrative lawyers that ‘an agency has 
the power to issue binding legislative rules only if and to the extent Congress has authorized it 
to do so.’” (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 6.3, at 234 (3d ed. 1994)). Embodied in this requirement of congressional 
delegation is “an anti-inherency principle . . . that agencies have no inherent authority to act 
with the force of law.” Id. at 2109. My discussion here leaves to the side the question of whether 
and to what extent the president has any inherent lawmaking authority, and thus whether in 
some contexts agencies might be able to act based solely on presidential delegation. 
 267. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916 (2006). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 151–65. 
 269. See supra text accompanying note 220. 
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contentious.270 Current nondelegation doctrine establishes that such 
specification by Congress is not thought generally required to respect 
Congress’s constitutional role—far from it. 
Thus, the claim that the administrative law approach is at odds 
with the Constitution misses its mark.271 In fact, this approach is 
arguably more consistent with constitutional federalism principles 
than doctrinal rubrics that seek to give trumping priority to either 
national or state interests. As discussed earlier in this Section, 
federalism concerns retain validity even when the federal government 
acts within its constitutional powers.272 Yet according state interests 
trumping priority may unduly underweigh the national side of the 
constitutional equation by erecting too great a burden for the federal 
government to overcome in seeking to exercise its constitutional 
powers. By contrast, the administrative law approach insists on the 
need to take account of both national and state interests in 
administrative contexts. State interests are given weight, but through 
an administrative law framework that also allows for consideration of 
other relevant factors. This seems not only more reflective of the 
national-state balance that informs the constitution, but also more in 
keeping with Congress’s likely intent in enacting the regulatory 
scheme at issue. 
A final objection to using administrative law to advance 
federalism concerns is more straightforwardly normative. It 
challenges the idea that state regulation per se adds value to national 
policy. From this perspective, the relevant issue for agencies should 
be simply designing the best national policy for a given regulatory 
context. If a decentralized approach is the most appropriate, then 
state regulation (perhaps pursuant to national standards) may have a 
role to play. But preserving state regulatory authority deserves no 
weight independent of such a beneficial impact on policy.273 
 
 270. Indeed, Professors Benjamin and Young candidly acknowledge that they themselves 
disagree on the appropriateness of such clear statement rules. See Benjamin & Young, supra 
note 265, at 2148. 
 271. I am, however, deeply indebted to Professors Benjamin and Young for showing me that 
poetry and administrative law can be linked. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 265, at 2114. 
 272. See supra notes 257–59. 
 273. Cf. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1949 (emphasizing that the relevant focus 
should be on “improving the regulatory process, not the preservation of state regulatory 
prerogatives per se”); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, 
Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, at 166, 167–69, 
173, 175, 179 (noting a lack of constitutional justification for privileging state regulation across 
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Underlying this view is often suspicion of state regulation as creating 
opportunities for parochialism, as well as skepticism that federalism 
in fact yields the advantages of experimentation, diversity, and liberty 
enhancement often invoked on its behalf.274 
This objection can be faulted for failing to appreciate the 
constitutional underpinnings for preserving a state regulatory role, 
and for its dim view of the value of state regulation. But it also fails 
on its own pragmatic and functionalist terms because it does not 
adequately acknowledge the continued relevance that federalism has 
for the courts. The disappearance of meaningful judicially enforced 
constitutional restrictions on the scope of federal regulatory authority 
has not meant the disappearance of judicial concern with preserving 
state authority. From a pragmatic perspective, the question therefore 
is not whether to protect state regulatory authority, but rather how to 
do so. Moreover, an administrative law approach would seem more 
attractive to those concerned with achieving the best policy outcome 
in specific contexts than the alternative of subconstitutional 
federalism doctrines. Instead of across-the-board restrictions, such as 
presumptions against preemption or clear statement requirements, an 
administrative law analysis focuses on the specifics of a statutory 
scheme and on how well an agency justifies a burden it is imposing on 
the states. As a result, it allows agencies greater leeway to advance 
their understanding of the best federal-state regulatory mix in a given 
area. 
IV.  ENHANCING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS 
AS A FEDERALISM VEHICLE 
This defense of using administrative law as a vehicle for 
addressing federalism concerns holds implications for the Court’s 
future jurisprudence. One central implication is that the Court should 
apply administrative law doctrines with an eye toward reinforcing 
agency attentiveness to state interests in regulatory autonomy. 
Another is that addressing federalism concerns through ordinary 
 
the board and advocating a subject-matter-specific default-rule approach that would identify 
instances in which values of uniformity should have priority). 
 274. For a classic statement of arguments against federalism, see Edward Rubin & Malcolm 
Feeley, Federalism: Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 927–52 (1994). For 
responses, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 380–406 (1997); 
Jackson, supra note 257, at 2216–23. 
02__METZGER.DOC 9/30/2008  2:05:45 PM 
2008] THE NEW FEDERALISM 2101 
 
administrative law may often prove more effective than devising 
special federalism-inspired doctrines. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Court must discuss much more openly how federalism should factor 
into agency decisionmaking and judicial review if it intends 
administrative law to include a federalism component. 
A. Reinforcing Agency Attentiveness to State Interests 
One implication of the foregoing analysis is that the Court should 
seek to reinforce agency incentives to take state regulatory interests 
into account. To some extent, the federalism–administrative law 
sextet does this. For example, Massachusetts’s “special solicitude for 
the states” in standing analysis makes it more likely that federal 
agencies will face federal court litigation by states who disagree with 
the result of administrative proceedings. As a result, agencies may 
well become more attentive to state interests in the course of 
administrative proceedings, whether in the hope of reaching 
compromises that would allay state suits or with an eye toward 
judicial review and the need to demonstrate that state concerns were 
adequately considered. In addition, a theme that emerges from the 
decisions read as a whole is that the absence of careful agency 
consideration of state interests may make searching judicial scrutiny 
more likely. To contrast ADEC and Oregon: limited federal trumping 
of the states will receive more deference than wholesale overruling, 
particularly when the circumstances of agency decisionmaking signal 
that ideology and politics rather than expertise were at work.275 Yet 
the impact of these decisions on agency behavior is likely to be muted 
as a result of their fact-dependent character and the Court’s failure to 
articulate a more general account of why agencies need to take state 
interests seriously. 
The Court’s jurisprudence to date is additionally deficient in two 
key areas: developing the federalism-reinforcing potential of 
administrative procedure, and insisting that agencies better justify 
and explain decisions and policies that intrude significantly on state 
regulatory endeavors. 
1. Federalism and Administrative Procedure.  As mentioned, 
although procedures surface in several decisions, their precise role in 
 
 275. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 93–96. 
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the Court’s analysis is never clearly identified.276 This omission is 
particularly unfortunate given that administrative procedure may 
offer important protection for state interests for the reasons described 
in Part III.A. Greater empirical evidence that administrative 
procedure in fact serves this role would be desirable. But if it does, 
one option for strengthening administrative law’s role as a federalism 
vehicle would be to enhance procedural protections accorded states. 
A move by the courts to impose new procedural obligations on 
their own initiative would encounter significant doctrinal obstacles, in 
the form of the Court’s instruction in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council 277 that “[a]bsent 
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 
‘administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure.’”278 Yet Vermont Yankee’s prohibition on new judicial 
procedural impositions leaves courts free to enforce the procedural 
requirements contained in statutes and agency rules, an escape hatch 
courts have exploited by crafting expansive interpretations of the 
procedural mandates contained in the APA.279 Such a route seems 
equally available here, as courts could strengthen administrative law’s 
sensitivity to federalism through vigorous enforcement of the APA’s 
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking and other statutory 
procedural requirements. For example, courts could relax their 
substantive scrutiny when agencies utilized procedures (whether 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or other measures) intended to 
ensure adequate attention to state interests, thereby creating 
incentives for agencies to impose such procedural requirements on 
themselves.280 In addition, courts could police the distinction between 
 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30. 
 277. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 278. Id. at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, it is possible to justify new 
judicial procedural impositions on the ground that constitutional federalism values should 
outweigh or at least temper the separation of powers and functional considerations that led the 
Court in Vermont Yankee to reject judicial development of administrative procedure. See id. at 
546–48. Such new procedural requirements would represent a form of special federalism-
inspired administrative law. 
 279. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial 
Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124, 126 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 
2006). 
 280. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 256–57 (recommending the imposition of consultation and 
notice-and-comment requirements in administrative preemption contexts); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 552–53 (2006). 
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legislative and nonlegislative rules tightly, insisting on notice-and-
comment procedures whenever an agency interpretive rule or policy 
statement had significant legal or practical effect on a state.281 
Alternatively, courts could strictly enforce notice and explanation 
requirements, requiring that federal agencies carefully identify and 
justify the preemptive or other effects of a proposed rule on the 
states. This latter option could have considerable practical relevance 
today. Some agencies recently have included statements in their 
explanation of final rules stating that they viewed the rules as broadly 
preempting state regulation and tort actions, despite having initially 
stated in the proposed rule notice that the rules would not be 
preemptive or would preempt more narrowly.282 Arguably, such 
position changes on preemption made the original notices 
inadequate, because the final rules were not a “logical outgrowth” of 
the proposed rule.283 Or, even if standard notice requirements were 
 
 281. Given the lack of a clear doctrinal distinction between these two types of rules, see 
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 915–27 (2004), such an 
approach would not require much by way of change in current practice, and, though not directly 
judicially enforceable, similar notice-and-comment requirements are imposed by executive 
order, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 206, 209–10 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 (2006); Exec. Order No. 12,988 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 157 (1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(2000). Arguably, increased court policing of this kind would have offered yet another basis for 
invalidating the interpretive (nonlegislative) rule in Oregon given the significant legal effects—
loss of license or criminal punishment—the rule imposed on doctors who used controlled 
substances to assist suicide, and the practical nullification of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
that the rule would have effected. 
 282. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254 (describing the FDA’s inclusion of a broad 
preemption statement in a recent prescription drug labeling rule, despite having initially stated 
in the notice of proposed rulemaking that the rule would not be preemptive); compare Final 
Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 
13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633) (stating that the CPSC rule would 
preempt all inconsistent state standards and requirements, including court-created requirements 
imposed through tort suits), with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Standard for the 
Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,470, 2,493 (Jan. 13, 2005) (stating 
that the proposed rule would preempt “non-identical state or local mattress flammability 
standards” and not indicating that the rule would preempt common law tort actions). 
 283. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2351 (2007) (describing 
the “logical outgrowth” requirement as “one of fair notice”). It could be argued that states and 
other commentators nonetheless had “fair notice” that the agencies were considering 
preemption. See id. (finding no notice violation when an agency changed position during 
rulemaking on the substantive scope of a rule). But the fact that the rules in question here were 
addressed to substantive topics other than preemption makes that conclusion harder to justify. 
Indeed, the fact that preemption is addressed solely in the preambles of these rules complicates 
assessment of whether failure to provide adequate notice of preemption would make the final 
rules invalid or simply would justify a court in failing to grant Chevron deference to the agency’s 
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satisfied in these instances, courts might conclude that additional 
notice is required before a federal rule can have a preemptive effect, 
at least when state law is not plainly in conflict with the rule.284 
2. Greater Scrutiny of Agency Decisions that Burden State 
Interests.  A second technique for protecting state interests, this time 
more evident in the six decisions, is subjecting agency decisions that 
burden state interests to greater substantive scrutiny than usually 
applied. Interestingly, the form in which this technique most clearly 
appears in the decisions—specifically, the Court’s use of independent 
scrutiny of statutory meaning—may be most problematic from an 
agency-incentivizing perspective. After all, why should agencies pay 
careful heed to federalism concerns in interpreting statutes if courts 
are unlikely to defer to their decisions?285 That said, lack of such 
scrutiny—and instead willingness to apply strong Chevron deference 
to agency interpretations that significantly displace state authority—
could remove a powerful check on federal agency overreaching at the 
states’ expense. For this reason, as noted, some scholars have argued 
against granting any deference to agency statutory interpretations 
that preempt state action or at most granting lesser Skidmore 
deference.286 
More beneficial, I believe, would be to approach the question 
from a perspective that emphasizes the quality of agency reasoning 
 
position on preemption; the latter would seem the correct result as an agencies’ failure to 
include a statement on preemption in the body of the rule suggests it does not intend such 
statements to have legal force and effect. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 
(2001); Sharkey, supra note 3, at 257–58; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 496–97. 
 284. Preemption of state law that actually conflicts with federal regulations is not 
contentious; what has sparked substantial debate is instead efforts to preempt state laws not 
directly in conflict on the grounds that they create an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme 
(as in Watters), or more rarely, that federal regulation indicates an intent to occupy the field. See 
Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 175, at 695; see also supra 
note 108 and accompanying text (noting an increase in findings of obstacle preemption). 
 285. Even the adoption of Skidmore may have such a deterrent effect, given that Skidmore 
ties deference to the degree to which an agency has succeeded in persuading a court that the 
agency’s view is correct and thus in practice may not differ much from independent scrutiny. 
But as Skidmore emphasizes the quality and reliability of agency decisions in deciding whether 
to defer, adoption of Skidmore as the standard under which to review agency preemption 
decisions seems better keyed to influencing agency decisionmaking than simply substituting 
independent judicial review. 
 286. See sources cited supra note 176. 
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and explanation.287 Agencies should face a greater burden of 
persuasion and explanation when their decisions substantially restrict 
state experimentation and traditional state functions. The doctrinal 
rubric most amenable to such an approach is arbitrary and 
capriciousness review, in part because it applies to all agency 
decisionmaking, whether involving matters of statutory interpretation 
or more straightforward policy setting. As a result, it avoids the odd 
dichotomy of denying deference to agency preemption 
interpretations yet reviewing agency substantive determinations quite 
deferentially, notwithstanding that the latter can impact the states as 
harshly. Arbitrary and capriciousness review also seems particularly 
well suited to curbing agency decisions that are unduly driven by 
executive branch politics at the expense of governing statutes.288 
The downside of relying on arbitrary and capriciousness review is 
that the impact on agency decisionmaking is harder to cabin. 
Agencies make a multitude of policy and implementation decisions 
that burden the states, far more than the number of preemptive 
interpretations they may issue. Imposing a greater justificatory 
burden when agency decisions impact negatively on state interests 
would create a substantial counterbalance to any tendency on the part 
of federal agencies to underweigh state interests. But arguably it does 
so by tilting the scales too much in favor of the states, at least if 
applied across the board, undermining the important uniformity and 
expertise benefits that federal regulation can offer and that Congress 
may have sought to achieve by delegating implementation 
responsibility to an administrative agency.289 This is not simply a 
question of national interests versus state interests, because national 
regulation can reinforce state authority by protecting states against 
 
 287. Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld also identify their preferred approach for 
ensuring agencies take state interests adequately into account as a species of hard look review. 
See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 2001–02 (“[T]he solution is that the appropriate level 
of deference is something of an amalgam of Skidmore and hard look review.”). Kenneth 
Bamberger has similarly advocated that courts use review of the reasonableness of agency 
determinations to ensure adequate agency consideration of general normative concerns, such as 
federalism, although he locates Chevron step two as the appropriate doctrinal home for such 
review. See Bamberger, supra note 178 (manuscript at 46–57). 
 288. It has been used in this way before. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40–44 (1983). 
 289. Cf. Schapiro, supra note 241, at 288–93 (discussing potential harms as well as benefits of 
concurrent federal and state regulation). 
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harmful externalities caused by sister state regulation (or lack 
thereof).290 
As a result, a contextual approach appears more appropriate, 
with greater justification perhaps required only in some 
circumstances—for example, when the burden on states is quite 
significant, or when governing statutes and historical practice have 
long tolerated a substantial role for state regulation.291 Here another 
advantage of the arbitrary and capriciousness review comes to fore, 
which is that such review already encompasses a broad range of 
scrutiny. As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, searching hard look 
scrutiny is more common with respect to notice-and-comment 
rulemakings, which produce generally applicable standards, than in 
less consequential informal adjudications.292 This particular pattern of 
scrutiny appears less appropriate in instances when agency actions 
significantly impact the states; given the potential federalism benefits 
that may accrue from use of notice-and-comment procedures, it 
would be odd to subject agency decisionmaking burdening the states 
outside those procedures to lesser review. But the fact that such 
variation already exists demonstrates the possibility of tailoring 
arbitrary and capricious review to federalism concerns. 
Interestingly, this is the approach implicitly suggested but never 
developed in Raich, and medical marijuana represents a prime 
context for its application. In light of strong state commitment to 
 
 290. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 108, at 1370–71; Merrill, supra note 273, at 173–
76. 
 291. See Bamberger, supra 178 (manuscript at 43); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 
2019–20. For arguments regarding the importance of a contextual approach to federalism, see 
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114–20 
(2005); Merrill, supra note 273, at 166, 167–68; Sharkey, supra note 176, at 514 (“Courts should 
scrutinize the regulatory process itself, relying on the FDA as a source of relevant information 
regarding the precise contours of the risks that it has considered.”). 
 292. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or ‘The Deciders’?: The Courts in Administrative Law, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1031822. Compare, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (hard look review in 
informal rulemaking), with Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645–47 
(1990) (deferential review in informal adjudication context), and Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 101–04 (1983) (greater deference in light of 
uncertainty). Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein’s recent empirical analysis of 
arbitrariness review supports this claim that arbitrary and capriciousness review encompasses a 
range of scrutiny, although they trace this variation to the ideology of the reviewing judges and 
the ideological content of the underlying decisions. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089076. 
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experimenting with medical marijuana, and the CSA’s provision for 
rescheduling of controlled substances based on medical purpose, the 
federal government should face a significant justificatory burden if it 
refuses to relist marijuana or undertake a sustained investigation of a 
rescheduling petition.293 Another context in which greater scrutiny 
might be appropriate concerns federal agency denial of state waiver 
requests. Waiver requests are often reviewed quite deferentially,294 
but greater scrutiny appears warranted when waiver authority is 
sought by a state and the waiver denial significantly restricts state 
regulatory autonomy.295 
B. Ordinary or Extraordinary Administrative Law? 
A final issue concerns whether administrative law’s federalism 
potential is best enhanced by developing special requirements 
applicable only when agency action impacts state interests, or instead 
by seeking to protect state interests from within the paradigms of 
ordinary administrative law. Given the capaciousness of ordinary 
federal administrative law, such special federalism-inspired rules do 
not seem necessary. Neither of the two proposals advanced in the 
preceding Section, for example, necessarily requires going outside of 
the paradigms of ordinary administrative law. Moreover, developing 
an extraordinary administrative law for federalism contexts may in 
fact undermine administrative law’s federalism potential insofar as it 
suggests that federalism concerns are not a legitimate focus of 
ordinary administrative law. Equally concerning, devising special 
federalism-inspired rules could erode the normalizing aspect of the 
administrative law approach, transforming it into something more 
 
 293. Cf. Young, supra note 93, at 33–37. A petition seeking such rescheduling appears to 
have been pending with the Drug Enforcement Agency since 2004, and an effort under the 
Information Quality Act to force HHS to correct information it provided on marijuana was 
recently dismissed on the ground that the Act is not judicially enforceable. Ams for Safe Access 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. C 07-01049 WHA, 2007 WL 4168511 at *2, *4 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007). 
 294. See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 
162 F.3d 1215, 1222, 1224–25 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 295. Such an approach could be relevant to several disputes in which the federal 
government has denied state waiver requests with important federalism implications. See, e.g., 
Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 494–95 (D. Conn. 2006) (challenging denial of 
waiver under the No Child Left Behind Act); see also supra note 53 (discussing the EPA’s 
denial of waiver to California under section 209 of the CAA). 
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exceptional like constitutional or subconstitutional federalism 
doctrines. 
The practical import of this caution against developing 
extraordinary administrative law doctrines is limited. The distinction 
between extraordinary and ordinary administrative law is far from 
bright-line. Most importantly, staying within the broad confines of 
ordinary administrative law does not mean foregoing express 
invocation of federalism concerns in administrative law decisions. 
Indeed, express acknowledgment of the need for agencies to seriously 
consider state regulatory interests is essential for administrative law 
to fulfill its federalism role, as well as needed for judicial 
accountability and agency-court dialogue more generally. A practice 
of vindicating state regulatory interests only tacitly is too easily 
discarded and too hidden to clearly instruct agencies or lower courts. 
Unless the Supreme Court is explicit about administrative law’s role 
as a federalism vehicle, the traditional view of these doctrines as 
analytically separate may make lower courts resistant to injecting 
federalism concerns into administrative law analysis. 
In some ways, the federalism–administrative law sextet accords 
with this caution against developing extraordinary administrative law. 
As discussed above, ordinary administrative law surfaces in all the 
decisions and none of the decisions, even Massachusetts, is necessarily 
beyond standard administrative law fare. But the decisions fail 
significantly on the factor of transparency. Even when the Court 
emphasized the impact of federal administrative decisions on the 
states, it offered little clarity on how that impact factored into its 
analysis. As a result, lower courts and agencies are left without much 
guidance on how to approach intersections of federalism and 
administrative law. 
Greater acknowledgment of the connection between federalism 
and administrative law is as important from an administrative law 
perspective as from a federalism one. The sextet of decisions indicates 
that, faced with federalism concerns, the Court may apply more 
searching scrutiny and in other ways push ordinary administrative law 
to extremes. From an administrative law perspective, the danger is 
that these more extreme approaches will spill over into contexts in 
which federalism concerns are absent. And the more frequently they 
are invoked, the more these approaches move from the margin to the 
core of established administrative law analysis. The net effect might 
be a general erosion of the deference accorded agency 
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determinations, not limited to contexts that implicate state regulatory 
interests. This suggests that, viewed purely from an agency-centered 
standpoint, developing special requirements limited to federalism 
contexts might be preferable to reliance on ordinary administrative 
law to address federalism concerns. But at a minimum, express 
discussion of how federalism concerns factor into a court’s application 
of ordinary administrative law requirements is important to limit such 
spillover effects. 
CONCLUSION 
Federalism and federal administrative law are increasingly 
intersecting. Indeed, given the breadth of Congress’s constitutional 
powers today, the future of federalism lies in integrating protections 
for the states into agency deliberations and judicial review of agency 
action. Until recently, the relationship between federalism and 
administrative law had not received the judicial and academic 
attention it deserves. That omission may be changing. As I have 
argued here, the Supreme Court may be using administrative law as a 
means of addressing federalism concerns, and at a minimum is 
becoming more aware of the intersections between these two 
doctrinal areas. That development, I believe, is an auspicious one, as 
administrative law has significant potential to advance state interests 
within the framework of the national administrative state. 
In the end, however, ensuring federalism’s continuing relevance 
within the world of administrative governance turns as much on 
creation of regulatory regimes that emphasize a continuing state 
regulatory role as on doctrinal adaptation. Using administrative law, 
the courts can ensure that federal agencies give due weight to 
considering state interests. But administrative law doctrine can only 
take federalism so far. Ultimately, the success of efforts to integrate 
federalism and the modern federal administrative state hinges on 
agencies—and their political masters in the executive branch and 
Congress—being willing to trade off some degree of uniformity for 
the benefits of diversity, experimentation, and localism in setting 
regulatory policy.296 
 
 296. For interesting efforts at identifying when such trade-offs may be merited, see Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 914–26 (2006); Buzbee, supra note 3, 
at 1599–613; Merrill, supra note 273, at 22–33. 
